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OPENING REMARKS 
A. Claudio Grossman1 
Dear friends, on behalf of the American University Washington College 
of Law, good morning and welcome to the MacArthur International 
Justice Lecture Series Conference on “Advocacy Before Regional 
Human Rights Bodies:  A Cross-Regional Agenda.”  We are honored 
to host this important conference, which will examine a vital subject.  
I am sure this joint initiative will contribute significantly to the 
strengthening of human dignity. 
We receive you today in an institution deeply committed to human 
rights and advocacy.  Our law school was the first law school in this 
country to be founded by women in a moment when women were not 
admitted into law schools or into the practice of the profession.  Our 
founding mothers believed that in order to achieve gender equality, 
it was essential that we educate men and women alike within the legal 
profession.  Their imagination and commitment transformed the 
profession and opened possibilities to achieve justice without 
discrimination. 
                                                 
 1. Claudio Grossman is a Professor of Law and, since 1995, Dean of the 
American University Washington College of Law, where he is also the Raymond Geraldson 
Scholar for International and Humanitarian Law.  Dean Grossman serves as the 
Chair of the United Nations Committee against Torture, and as a member of the 
Commission for the Control of Interpol’s Files.  Additionally, he is a member of the 
Governing Board of the International Association of Law Schools and Chair of the 
Association of American Law Schools Committee on International Cooperation.  
Dean Grossman is currently a member of the Board of the College of the Americas, 
where he served as President from 2003–2007.  He was a member of the  
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights from 1993–2001, where he served in 
numerous capacities including two terms as President, two terms as First Vice 
President, Second Vice President, Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women, 
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Populations, and Observer of the 
AMIA Trial.  Dean Grossman has authored numerous publications regarding 
international law and human rights and has received numerous awards for his work 
in those fields. 
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Following their example, our students, faculty, and administrators 
have developed numerous initiatives to promote and protect human 
rights.  As one example, our Academy on Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law attracts leading scholars and activists in the 
universal and regional systems as well as hundreds of students 
interested in international law every year. 
Another example includes our Center for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law, which has spearheaded major human rights 
initiatives to fight injustice.  The Center recently launched a new 
institute in collaboration with the International Committee of the 
Red Cross to train law school professors on the substance and 
importance of international humanitarian law and, in particular,  
the teaching of the Geneva Conventions. 
Our renowned clinical program includes nine in-house clinics in 
areas such as international human rights, disability rights, domestic 
violence, intellectual property, and community economic 
development.  Our clinics took the first case in the United States 
involving female genital mutilation; by changing the jurisprudence 
on this matter to allow such mutilation to be grounds for asylum, the 
clinics broadened the scope of the law with respect to this issue.  Our 
clinics also represent clients in the United States, Africa, and Latin 
America, offering pro bono assistance to incorporate international 
law into the domestic realm.  The Washington College of Law has also 
created the United Nations Committee Against Torture Project, 
which works to reinforce and strengthen the notion that there is no 
justification for torture whatsoever, and that it is essential to comply 
with the provisions of the Convention Against Torture in all its 
dimensions. 
Our Impact Litigation Project, another initiative in the law school, 
stresses accountability, freedom of expression, rights of women, and 
rights of indigenous populations.  Our school also founded the first 
war crimes research institution in the United States to support 
research and fight impunity for international crimes.  Since it was 
founded, the institution has understood that accountability is an 
essential requirement for the rule of law. 
As we develop our numerous programs and activities, we have seen 
that we learn as much, or even more than what we contribute.  In the 
past, law schools would do research, store the products of such 
research in libraries, train people, and thereafter claim certain 
exclusivity over the particular substantive areas.  Now we see 
numerous institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
international bodies, and think tanks that engage in similar pursuits, 
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thereby diversifying knowledge and its sources.  In our strategic 
vision, partnering with different actors provides ways to learn from 
each other and to multiply our outreach. 
In that spirit, we have envisioned this conference as a space for the 
exchange of experiences and cross-culture communication between 
regional organizations that supervise compliance with human rights 
treaties.  During this conference, we seek to discuss approaches and 
experiences in combating impunity, the scope of reparations, 
difficulties and accomplishments in guaranteeing the enforcement of 
reparations, and the overall challenges facing regional systems for the 
protection of human rights.  Although we will be referring to 
different treaty-based regional supervisory organs, the fact that a 
similar language is used by all three constituent treaties opens up 
space for comparisons and identification of good practices.  After all, 
the narrative of human rights is that of human dignity—that unites us 
all. 
Before we begin, I would like to take this opportunity to welcome 
our distinguished participants, especially those who have come from 
afar, and to thank them in advance for sharing their unique insights.  
We are joined by participants from Africa, Europe, and the Americas, 
each representing different international organizations, law courts, 
civil societies, and academic institutions. 
Let me thank, above all, the MacArthur Foundation whose support 
and commitment made this conference possible.  We give special 
thanks to Mary Page, Director of the Human Rights and International 
Justice Area within the Program on Global Security and 
Sustainability. 
I would also like to thank the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (“Inter-American Commission”) and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (“Inter-American Court”) for their 
co-sponsorship.  In spite of their limited resources, both supervisory 
organs reach out to civil society through the personal commitment of 
their members. 
Our special thanks also go to the Inter-American Commission and 
Inter-American Court’s secretariat and to Mr. Jose Miguel Insulza, 
Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS). 
I also want to thank the American University Law Review and its 
editors-in-chief, Karen Williams (Volume 58) and David Courchaine 
(Volume 59).  The Law Review will be publishing the proceedings of 
this conference.  It bodes well for the legal profession to have 
students like those on our Law Review attracted to the legal field.  In 
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spite of their regular pressures as law students, they have volunteered 
to do this important job. 
Let me also thank my colleague, Professor Diane Orentlicher, 
renowned international law expert.  Diane came up with the idea of 
this conference and put the law school in touch with the MacArthur 
Foundation. 
Our gratitude also goes to Agustina Del Campo, the coordinator of 
our Impact litigation Project, who helped organize and shape this 
event. 
It is my pleasure now to introduce Mr. Jonathan Fanton who has 
served as the President of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur 
Foundation since 1999.  Mr. Fanton oversees one of the nation’s 
largest foundations—a foundation which makes grants and runs 
programs related to the investment of more than one quarter of a 
billion dollars annually and works in more than sixty countries.  
Domestically, the Foundation’s programs encompass community 
development, housing, juvenile justice, and education with a focus on 
digital media and learning.  Internationally, the Foundation works in 
the fields of human rights and international justice, biodiversity 
conservation, population and reproductive health, international 
peace and security, as well as migration and human mobility.  The 
Foundation is also well known for its support of exceptionally creative 
individuals through the MacArthur Fellows Program. 
In addition to outstanding leadership and management of the 
MacArthur Foundation, Mr. Fanton is a board member and former 
board chairperson of Human Rights Watch, the largest U.S.-based 
human rights organization, which operates in seventy countries.  He 
is also an advisory trustee of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, a 
member of the Board of Trustees of the Chicago History Museum, 
the founding Board Chair of the Security Council Report, and Co-
Chair of Chicago’s Partnership for New Communities.  Mr. Fanton is 
also a distinguished author and editor, having written The University 
and Civil Society, Volumes I and II,2 and being co-editor of John Brown:  
Great Lives Observed3 and The Manhattan Project:  A Documentary 
Introduction to the Atomic Age.4 
                                                 
 2. JONATHAN F. FANTON, THE UNIVERSITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY (New School for 
Social Research 1995). 
 3. JOHN BROWN:  GREAT LIVES OBSERVED (Richard Warch & Jonathan Fanton 
eds., 1973). 
 4. THE MANHATTAN PROJECT:  A DOCUMENTARY INTRODUCTION TO THE ATOMIC 
AGE (Michael B. Stoff, Jonathan F. Fanton & R. Hal Williams eds., Temple University 
Press 1991). 
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We are fortunate to have him at the helm of the MacArthur 
Foundation, contributing greatly to the promotion of important 
values.  Thank you very much. 
B. Jonathan Fanton5 
Thank you, Dean Grossman, for those kind words and for 
sponsoring this important colloquium.  It has been a great pleasure 
working with your faculty and staff.  They have done a superb job, 
and we are really privileged to be here. 
There is a little known part of my biography not mentioned, which 
is that in the 1990s, I chaired the Middle States Accreditation Review 
for American University.  So this is a university that I know extremely 
well.  And I have great respect for all parts of it, but particularly for 
the law school that stood out in that accreditation in the 1990s. 
This is one of four convocations MacArthur is sponsoring to mark 
its 30th anniversary and to remind us that human rights and 
international justice have been at the core of MacArthur’s work since 
its founding.  We began with the first conference at DePaul to assess 
the progress and prospects of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC).  Early next year there will be a symposium at the Yale Law 
School on building political will to advance the system of international 
justice followed by an event at University of California, Berkeley that will 
explore how witnesses and victims participate in international courts 
and tribunals. 
The Washington College of Law, distinguished by its long 
commitment to human rights and international law, is an appropriate 
venue for the second convocation in our series.  MacArthur is deeply 
impressed with the work of this institution, your Center for Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Law, the International Human Rights Law 
Clinic, and the War Crimes Research Office are among many 
programs here that advance human rights and international law.  
Monitoring and reporting on the international Inter-American 
Court, analyzing defense procedures for those indicted by the ICC, 
training both scholars and activists in human rights law, and more—
the Washington College of Law has established American University as a 
leading venue for research, debate, and action in our quest for an 
effective system of international justice. 
The contributions of your faculty members are far-reaching:  your 
Dean, as past president of the Inter-American Commission and now 
Chair of the United Nations Committee Against Torture; my friend, 
                                                 
 5. President, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. 
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Herman Schwartz, advising new governments in east and central 
Europe on constitutional reform; Robert Goldman, another former 
Inter-American Commission President, now serving on the 
International Commission of Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, 
Counter-Terrorism, and Human Rights; and Diane Orentlicher, 
working with the UN as an independent expert on combating 
impunity.  I know that is not everybody, but any law school in the 
world would be proud of this faculty and its contributions. 
Your work resonates profoundly with MacArthur’s aspiration to 
advance the rights of all to seek redress when national courts fail to 
produce justice.  Over the years, MacArthur has supported 600 
institutions, working on the frontlines in ninety countries, to expose 
abuses and strengthen the rule of law.  We have a deep interest in 
helping to fashion an integrated system of international justice that 
includes the ICC, regional human rights courts and commissions, 
and special tribunals impaneled by the UN as well as the UN Human 
Rights Council. 
MacArthur supported the Coalition for the ICC that helped bring 
the ICC into existence more quickly than expected; global rights, 
among others, to gather evidence useful in the ICC’s first cases; the 
Institute of War and Peace reporting to train local jurists to train local 
ICC trials; redress to help engage victims and witnesses; and the 
International Bar Association to conduct independent analysis of the 
ICC’s proceedings.  We hope that stronger accountability will deter 
those who would commit mass atrocities but we know there will be 
situations that require prompt action to prevent future situations like 
the one in Rwanda. 
MacArthur was privileged to support the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which articulated the doctrine 
of Responsibility to Protect adopted by the UN in 2005.  It affirms 
that when states fail to protect, or worse, commit abuses against their 
own citizens, the international community has the responsibility to 
step in to protect citizens. 
The world has a stronger arsenal for justice now than ever before.  
While each element had quite separate origins, we are on the cusp of 
forging an integrated system of international justice from the 
disparate parts—and that is what these convocations are meant to say 
and to illustrate. 
The age of impunity is about to give way to an age of 
accountability.  The high profile cases of Slobodan Milosovic, 
Radovan Karadzic, Charles Taylor, Augusto Pinochet, Alberto 
Fujimori, and Omar Al-Bashir show that leaders can no longer 
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commit genocide and crimes against humanity without 
consequences.  And the tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone, and Cambodia are trying hundreds of other top-level 
perpetrators. 
But the story of the regional courts and commissions is just as 
impressive, and it needs to be told.  Their activity and influence are 
on the rise.  What we want to do through this colloquium is to 
underscore that it is not just the high profile cases that you read 
about—it is the everyday work on thousands of cases by the regional 
courts and commissions that is helping to build the system of 
international justice. 
The European Court of Human Rights (“European Court” or 
“Strasbourg Court”) in 1989 registered only 400 cases, but last year, 
some 40,000 cases were registered.  The Inter-American Court, twenty 
years younger, has some 150 active cases but the level of applications 
is rising:  1500 petitions were received just last year.  And the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African Court”), which is 
only four years old, is preparing to try its first cases.  While there is yet 
no human rights mechanism on a regional basis in Asia, the recently 
adopted ASEAN Charter includes a provision for a human rights 
body and talks are now underway on its design.  So Europe, Inter-
America, Africa, and eventually Asia are all coming together. 
Regional courts and commissions provide ordinary people with the 
opportunity to appeal cases of police abuse, discrimination, or 
abridgement of free expression and assembly when they have 
exhausted remedies within national justice systems.  Regional courts 
can raise the quality of justice in national courts, and a stronger 
culture for the rule of law may well prevent everyday abuses from 
aggregating into the worst crimes imaginable. 
MacArthur has a deep interest in strengthening these regional 
bodies.  We have funded NGOs such as Access to Justice in Nigeria, 
and the Black Soil Center for the Protection of Media Rights in 
Russia to bring precedent-setting cases to these courts and 
commissions.  We are also interested in helping the regional courts 
and commissions directly and will, I hope, early in 2009, announce a 
major new initiative aimed at helping the new African Court take 
root. 
Now, for all of this encouraging news, we know there are 
challenges to realizing the full potential of regional and sub-regional 
mechanisms—which we should also talk about—and that is the topic 
of this conference.  How do we make the recommendations of 
regional human rights bodies more effective?  How do we choose 
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cases that will set influential precedents?  How do we strengthen the 
network of NGOs to build strong cases and bring them forward, 
especially in Africa.  How do we share experience and expertise most 
effectively and strengthen cooperation across regions and countries?  
These are the critical questions that our eminent panelists will be 
addressing today.  You have put together just an extraordinary group 
of panelists.  They collectively have moved the international justice 
system forward to where it is today. 
To recognize the contributions of the people in this room and on 
these panels and the many others who have labored to build this 
system, the MacArthur Foundation last year created an award for 
advancing international justice.  The award honors an individual or 
organization that advances the cause of international justice—it 
could be a world leader, a courageous judge, or an ordinary citizen 
working through a human rights group.  The first recipient was 
former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in recognition of his 
contribution to building the ICC and encouraging the development 
of the responsibility to protect. 
We have chosen this venue to announce the second winner of the 
MacArthur International Justice Award.  We have chosen someone 
present at the creation of the modern era of international justice, a 
distinguished jurist and legal scholar, a person whose clarity of 
purpose, fairness, and credibility is a force that inspires all who labor 
in the special tribunals, regional human rights courts, and the ICC 
itself.  And so it is with great pleasure, great honor, that I announce 
that the second recipient of the MacArthur Award for International 
Justice will be Richard J.  Goldstone. 
Justice Goldstone, already a prominent judge, came to 
international attention as the Chair of the Commission of Inquiry 
regarding public violence and intimidation in the aftermath of 
apartheid in his native South Africa.  His wise and even-handed 
direction of the Commission proved invaluable to the democratic 
transition in that country where he also served as an inaugural 
member of the Constitutional Court. 
In 1994, Justice Goldstone was appointed Chief Prosecutor of the 
UN International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
for Rwanda, the first of their kind since Nuremberg.  His mature, 
meticulous, and measured exercise of that mandate reanimated the 
enterprise of international justice, bringing both a degree of 
resolution to victims and a new model for the prosecution of crimes 
against humanity. 
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Insisting on the independence of the counsel and judges, a 
transparent establishment of the facts in each case, due process 
protections for the accused, and the centrality of first-hand testimony 
from witnesses and surviving victims, Judge Goldstone gave the 
tribunals moral authority and legal credibility.  It is a testament to the 
quality of his work that the international community accepted the 
Rome Statute and established the ICC with confidence.  Justice 
Goldstone stood guarantor for the responsibility, probity, and value 
of international justice:  his unquestioned competence and integrity 
won the faith of the world.  At the close of his recent memoir, For 
Humanity:  Reflections of a War Crimes Investigator, Justice Goldstone 
had these words: 
No longer will dictators or oppressive governments be able to 
violate the fundamental rights of citizens with impunity.  We 
are moving into a new and different world.  I have no doubt 
that the 21st Century will witness the growth of an 
International Criminal Justice System and that the victims of 
war crimes will no longer be ignored.6 
Sharing that goal, and in tribute to all Richard Goldstone has 
accomplished, the MacArthur Foundation is indeed privileged to 
name him the second recipient of our award which will be conferred, 
appropriately, in the Hague in May 2009. 
So, in closing, I want to thank all of you for your kind attention.  I 
want to applaud your efforts to ensure that all members of the 
human family are treated with fairness and respect.  We look forward 
to making common cause with you in pursuit of a more just, humane, 
and peaceful world.  Have a great conference. 
I. PANEL 1:  PERSPECTIVES, APPROACHES, AND EXPERIENCES IN 
COMBATING IMPUNITY 
A. Diane Orentlicher7 
Along with Claudio, I would like to begin by thanking the 
MacArthur Foundation for supporting this colloquium.  The 
MacArthur Foundation has long been one of the crucial supporters 
of the institutions that ensure meaningful protection of human rights 
in difficult circumstances around the globe as well as individuals who 
have been in the forefront and in the frontlines and trenches in 
                                                 
 6. RICHARD J.  GOLDSTONE, FOR HUMANITY:  REFLECTIONS OF A WAR CRIMES 
INVESTIGATOR 138 (2000). 
 7. Co-director, Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, American 
University, Washington College of Law, and Professor of International Law. 
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defending human rights against incredible challenges.  Under the 
leadership of Jonathan Fanton, the Foundation has very often been 
the wind behind the sails of those who are indeed facing these 
challenges and working to defend human rights around the world, 
and to strengthen the institutions that we are going to be talking 
about today, that help ensure protection in a systemic way. 
I also want to thank Mary Page of the MacArthur Foundation for 
being a friend and for allowing us to tap her wisdom as we planned 
this session, as well as Agustina and Jennifer from the Washington 
College of Law, who have really knocked themselves out to pull this 
together.  And finally, I want to thank the Inter-American Court and 
Commission for co-hosting this event. 
Turning to the subject of this panel, the Inter-American human 
rights bodies have been leaders in the subject matter of this panel, 
that is, in developing both legal tools and institutional mechanisms to 
combat impunity.  The law and institutions of human rights 
developed to combat impunity are truly global and increasingly 
interrelated, even as they continue to operate in largely separate and 
distinct spheres. 
I have had a number of occasions to be impressed by the inter-
connectedness of these institutions and developments.  Let me 
mention just one, however, that brought home to me how important 
it is to foster a cross-regional dialogue among institutions committed 
to promoting human rights.  Several years ago, the Secretary-General 
of the UN asked me to undertake a study assessing recent 
developments globally in combating impunity.  As my research 
progressed, I was struck to see how much, when one institution—
such as the Inter-American Court, the UN Commission on Human 
Rights, or the UN Human Rights Committee—took the lead in 
establishing a new benchmark of protection for human rights, their 
decisions tended to have an inspirational effect across regions and 
across institutions.  For example, when one treaty body adopted a 
decision declaring amnesties impermissible to the extent that they 
cover atrocious crimes, other human rights bodies were inspired to 
be more courageous than they otherwise might have been in 
establishing similar protections in their own case law. 
Significantly too, I was struck by the fact that it was not just that 
regional human rights bodies and international bodies, like the UN 
Human Rights Committee, that were following each other’s lead in 
interpreting key human rights treaties—there has also been a new 
synergy between these human rights bodies and international 
criminal tribunals, which have been an important feature of the 
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international landscape in combating impunity for the past fifteen 
years since the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), followed by several other tribunals 
including a permanent international criminal court. 
To offer one example, ten years ago the ICTY explicitly recognized 
something we had all thought to be the case—that rape is a form of 
torture.  In support of its conclusion, it cited an important decision 
several years earlier from the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights recognizing that rape is a form of torture, as well as an 
important decision from the European Court—decided one year 
before the ICTY’s judgment—similarly recognizing that rape is a 
form of torture.  And so we do, as Jonathan Fanton said, have an 
increasingly interconnected architecture of protection, and the 
disparate parts influence each other in important ways.  Major 
breakthroughs in one system have often resounded across the system 
of disparate bodies. 
In today’s panel we are going to look at some of the achievements 
in one particular and especially important area of protection:  
responses of human rights bodies to the challenge of impunity. 
The first speaker this morning is Felipe González, a member of the 
Inter-American Commission.  He also serves as Rapporteur on 
Migrant Workers and their Families and as a full-time professor of 
constitutional law at Diego Portales University. 
B. Felipe González8 
Thank you very much Diane, and thank you for the invitation to 
participate at this conference.  I will try to do my best to speak in the 
ten minutes assigned to me.  I will speak mostly about the evolution 
of the treatment of gross violations of human rights in the Inter-
American system and discuss its influence on other systems. 
Over the last fifteen or twenty years there has been a dramatic 
evolution in the international approach to gross human rights 
violations and confrontation with these violations.  This is a dynamic 
process in changing contexts.  While he was in office, former 
President Aylwin of Chile pointed out that what had to be achieved 
was as much justice as possible.  But in fact, what has happened is that 
what has become possible has notably expanded, not only in Chile, 
but in many other countries, in part or to a larger extent as a result of 
developments in international law. 
                                                 
 8. Felipe González is a Commissioner at the Inter-American Human Rights 
Commission.  He is also a Professor of International Law and Constitutional Law at 
Diego Portales University, Santiago de Chile. 
  
2009] ADVOCACY BEFORE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES 175 
In a nutshell, what changed?  The situation used to be that the 
confrontation of these violations was subordinated to politics.  Take 
Spain, for instance, which in 1977 issued a broad amnesty law.  The 
international community did not complain at all about it.  The same 
happened with respect to many countries at that time.  It was a 
situation where the demands of the victims were mostly perceived by 
society as testimonial in character, without a strong legal basis.  
Therefore, at the best, their demands would be partially considered 
to be balanced with the political constraints, including the demands 
from the perpetrators themselves, who were usually part of or 
otherwise linked in some ways to the armed forces.  In that context in 
the mid-1980s, the Inter-American Commission made a distinction 
between those amnesty laws for gross violations issued by 
dictatorships—such was the case of Chile for instance—and those 
that were the result of democratic decisions. 
The former, the Inter-American Commission said at that time in 
the mid-80s, were incompatible with international standards.  The 
latter, the Commission said, was a matter for domestic decision.  But 
over the last fifteen years, the situation experienced a significant 
change.  The confrontation of gross violations is not seen any longer 
at the discretion of governments, but something that is required by 
international law.  And in this regard, the Inter-American 
Commission itself and the Inter-American Court have played a very 
important role.  So, since the late 1980s, jurisprudence from the 
Inter-American Court and Commission started to address this issue, 
sometimes in an explicit manner and sometimes in an implicit 
manner, in a broader perspective. 
This started with the judgment of the Inter-American Court in the 
late 1980s in Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras9 in which the Court stated 
that it was a duty for the state to fully guarantee the protection of 
human rights and that this included the investigation—full 
investigation—of human rights crimes, prosecution of prosecutors, 
and sanctioning the perpetrators.  The case however, did not address 
explicitly an amnesty law as such.  This kind of case, instead, came to 
the Inter-American Commission in the early 1990s and that showed a 
dramatic change in the jurisprudence of the Commission compared 
to the decision in the mid 1980s that I just spoke about.  These were 
the cases regarding Argentina and Uruguay, and their respective 
amnesty laws.  The Commission found that those amnesties while 
enacted by democratic regimes in Argentina and Uruguay, were 
                                                 
 9. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (July 29, 1988). 
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nonetheless contrary to the American Convention on Human Rights 
(“American Convention”). 
At that time, I remember I was living here in Washington, D.C., 
and there were very strong reactions, not only from the Uruguayan 
and Argentinean governments at the time, but also from many other 
countries.  That the Inter-American Commission interpreted the 
American Convention in this way seemed like something new.  
However, over time, and during the 1990s, this started to be a very 
significant development at the Inter-American system. 
In fact, I remember that when the Inter-American Commission 
issued these decisions in 1992, Louis Joinet, who was the UN expert 
in charge of the topic of impunity, circulated some drafts regarding 
this matter.  Those drafts—one from 1993, for instance—were much 
softer in their approach than the Commission’s approach at the time.  
In that draft that was publicly circulated by Mr. Joinet, it was not said 
in a peremptory way that states should always prosecute and sanction 
the victims.  However, over time, you can see how that approach 
evolved, and in its final report in 1997, Mr. Joinet basically agreed 
with the position of the Commission on the interpretation of 
international law.  Later on, the Commission issued several decisions 
in 1996 and 1998 about the amnesty law in Chile, which were not 
hard cases because it was a self-amnesty by the dictatorship, unlike 
those amnesties from Argentina and Uruguay. 
In the current decade, the Inter-American Court addressed the 
issue in several cases.  These cases include Barrios Altos v. Perú,10 
concerning two amnesty laws issued by the Fujimori regime in Peru; 
Goiburú v. Paraguay,11 where there was not an amnesty law, but in 
some cases a lack of a thorough investigation that the Court said was 
required according to international standards; and Almonacid-Arellano 
v. Chile12 against Chile, in which the Court developed the doctrine 
that the crimes against humanity had to be fully prosecuted and 
sanctioned by states. 
This evolution has made clear that according to the American 
Convention on Human Rights, there is a state duty to investigate 
gross violations and to prosecute and sanction the perpetrators.  This 
evolution does not mean that in practice today states are 
automatically following these standards.  They have followed them to 
different extents.  However, the crucial difference is that today the 
issue of confronting the past is at the center of any process of 
                                                 
 10. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75 (Mar. 14, 2001). 
 11. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 153 (Sept. 22, 2006). 
 12. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154 (Sept. 26, 2006). 
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transition from an internal armed conflict to democracy.  This was 
not the case fifteen or twenty years ago.  It is not any more an issue 
that can simply be avoided by governments invoking political 
constraints. 
In the end, this solution has also, as a consequence, significantly 
enhanced the position of the victims and their relatives, making 
stronger their demands.  I said at the beginning of my presentation 
that fifteen or twenty years ago, the victims did not have such a strong 
legal basis in international law, and most of their demands were seen 
as testimonial in nature.  Now that is not the case.  It is a significant 
step forward for the protection of their rights.  Thank you very much. 
****** 
Diane Orentlicher:  Thank you so much for that wonderfully lucid 
overview of the evolution of the work of the Inter-American system in 
combating impunity.  Felipe ended by talking about how this 
jurisprudence, which initially came like a bolt out of the blue for 
leaders in Latin America, began to take root over time, and gradually 
expectations regarding how states would confront a legacy of abuse 
has begun to change.  This provides a nice foundation for other 
panelists’ remarks, as one of the points I am sure we will address in 
this panel is how those judgments eventually took root against 
resistance and addressed challenges in implementation.   
I would like to call on Judge Leonardo Franco next.  Judge Franco 
is an extraordinarily distinguished member of the Inter-American 
Court.  He has had a distinguished record of service in numerous 
capacities, including at high levels of government in Argentina and as 
Special Rapporteur for Human Rights for Sudan on behalf of the 
Commission of Human Rights at the UN.  I would like to welcome 
Judge Franco. 
C. Leonardo Franco13 
Thank you.  First of all, I would like to say that it is with great 
satisfaction and pride that I participate in this important panel at this 
University, a University that has contributed so much to the 
development of international human rights law and humanitarian 
law in Latin America.  Today’s topic—how to deal with the past—has 
                                                 
 13. Judge, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Organization of American 
States.  The views expressed are those of the speaker and do not necessarily reflect 
those of the Commission or the OAS. 
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great significance, and is central to the transition of totalitarian 
regimes to democratic systems. 
In many cases, our pasts are laden with systematic violations.  
Impunity is really a system, one that has been built up through 
regulations and practices.  It will take time and much effort to 
dismantle such a system.  It is also being fought through legal 
reforms, but more importantly, through the human rights 
movements taking place in academic and political circles.  This 
dynamic process has taken place in Argentina, among other places, 
and I would like to refer to the specific ways in which Argentina was 
able to come to terms with its burdensome past. 
Before its withdrawal, the military left a law of impunity as a parting 
gift, which is a common practice among totalitarian governments.  
This law of impunity was relatively easy to abolish by the newly 
established administration headed by Mr. Alfonsín, who was elected 
president on a human rights agenda. 
Shortly after, the Government focused on the task of prosecuting 
the military commanders who had directed the military process of 
repression.  Five high ranking military generals were given long 
prison terms and four were acquitted.  We thought that this would be 
the end of the problem, but we were wrong. 
A period of intense pressure then followed, as it usually does, 
which threatened the stability of the democratic system.  
Consequently, the system was compelled—and this created much 
controversy—to adopt measures that strengthened impunity.  For 
example, two laws, the Law of Due Obedience and the “Punto Final” 
Law, severely limited the investigation of other actions perpetrated 
against other people. 
Moreover, with the change of administration and after Dr. Menem 
was installed as constitutional President, there was also a need to take 
other measures, which were pardon laws, or pardons for individual 
cases.  Argentina was therefore caught in a vise, and there was a huge 
reaction against these measures, both from the domestic and 
international communities.  Fortunately, the Inter-American system 
played an important role in ensuring Argentina’s transition towards 
the rule of law through which the responsibility of those who 
committed violations could be examined. 
This process was facilitated by a judgment by the Argentina 
Supreme Court in the 1990s, which established that the status of 
international human rights treaties was similar to the status of the 
Constitution.  This judgment was later strengthened by the 1994 
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constitutional reform which placed human rights treaties in first 
place. 
In the mean time, the Argentina Supreme Court issued decisions 
that established the constitutionality of measures of impunity 
adopted by previous administrations.  These decisions were criticized, 
as Felipe had just mentioned, by the Inter-American Commission.  
The Commission’s criticisms had nothing to do with Argentina, but 
instead had to do with a neighboring country, Peru, which provided 
the legal basis for an in-depth analysis of the self-amnesty measures 
that Argentina had adopted.  This was the case of Barrios Altos,14 which 
Felipe has also mentioned, and which is considered fundamental vis-
à-vis those measures through which a regime declares itself to be 
unaccountable. 
I would like to comment on the amnesty laws.  There was a period 
during which amnesty laws were viewed as a positive aspect of human 
rights.  I remember that in my work with refugees in the 1970s in 
various parts of the world—Africa, Latin America—governments and 
states were asked to grant amnesty in order to allow for the safe 
return of refugees.  In Brazil there was a huge movement in the 1970s 
in favor of amnesty.  But this was amnesty that the victims requested 
from the authorities.  The amnesty laws that we are referring to now 
are measures passed by the same governments, the same authorities 
that systematically violated human rights. 
In Barrios Altos, the Inter-American Court held that whenever 
irrevocable rights (recognized as such by international human rights 
law) are violated, all amnesty provisions, provisions on statutory 
limitations, and measures designed to eliminate responsibility are 
inadmissible.15  This is because they are intended to prevent the 
investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious human 
rights violations including:  torture; extrajudicial, summary, or 
arbitrary execution; and enforced disappearances.  These actions are 
prohibited because they violate fundamental rights recognized by 
international human rights law.  Moreover, an interpretive judgment 
by the same Court held that the Barrios Altos decision had general 
application; it went beyond that particular case.16 
Most importantly, Argentina, which was not directly linked to the 
judgment, was receptive to the Inter-American Court’s case law.  In 
                                                 
 14. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75 (Mar. 14, 2001). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Case of Barrios Altos (Interpretive Judgment), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 83 (Sept. 3, 2001). 
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Simón,17 an extremely important case, the Argentina Supreme Court 
stated that the Laws of Due Obedience and “Punto Final” were null 
and void.18  In this way, the period in Argentine history characterized 
by the lack of search for the truth and the lack of accountability of 
the perpetrators of violations finally came to an end. 
This made possible the indictment of many others.  Very recently, 
two military generals—the governor of Tucumán and the chief 
commander of the military—notoriously involved in the repression in 
Argentina were given life terms, and the Barrios Altos case was cited. 
I would like to comment briefly on four concepts articulated in the 
Simón case, which concerns us all.  First, the standard established by 
the Inter-American Court in the case of Barrios Altos “cannot be 
satisfied, and it would be insufficient to repeal the Due Obedience 
and Punto Final Laws if at the same time measures were not taken to 
make it impossible to invoke the most lenient penal law.”19  Second, 
“if the decisions of the international tribunal are interpreted in good 
faith as legal precedent, it is imperative that the findings of the Inter-
American Court in the case of Barrios Altos apply to the case of 
Argentina.”20  Third, international treaties on human rights should be 
interpreted according to international law.  In other words, they 
should not be interpreted according to national law, but according to 
international law.  Lastly, the jurisprudence of the Inter-American 
Court and the directives of the Commission constitute essential 
guides for the interpretation of the duties and obligations emanating 
from the Inter-American Convention of Human Rights.  In other 
words, national judges must also interpret and apply the Inter-
American Convention. 
Previously, there was another case that I will refer to briefly, the 
Arancibia Clavel21 case.  This was a case that involved (repressive) 
actions against Chilean activists; there was a web of informants that 
provided information on persons persecuted in Buenos Aires.22  This 
case,  in which Arancibia Clavel was indicted, is considered a leading 
case on the subject, because not only did it mean the recognition but 
also the application of this principle to those actions that occurred 
                                                 
 17. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 14/6/2005, “Simón, Julio Héctor y otros,” 
Collección Officiál de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de la Nación [Fallos] (2005-328-
2056) (Arg.). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 24/8/2004, “Arancibia Clavel, Enrique 
Lautaro y otros,” Collección Officiál de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de la Nación 
[Fallos] (2004-327-3294) (Arg.). 
 22. Id. 
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before the ratification of the Convention on the Non-Applicability of 
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity 
throughout Argentina. 
Finally, a brief reference to a previous case in which the Inter-
American Court addressed the topic of pardons, which was the key 
element needed to put an end to impunity.  The Court in this case, 
also invoking the Barrios Altos decision, held that the pardons were 
measures that breached the Inter-American Convention of Human 
Rights.  However, I should also note that this opened up a new 
controversy, because two judges in the minority dissented, 
maintaining that it affected constitutional rights such as res judicata.  
Which means that this is not the end of the story. 
Thank you. 
D. Discussion 
Diane Orentlicher:  Thank you so much.  I want to underscore one of 
the points that came out of Judge Franco’s remarks because it is so 
terribly important.  In countries where really notable advances have 
been made in confronting amnesty laws and other obstacles to 
accountability, the legal status of international treaties and domestic 
law often seems to be critical.  An important example is highlighted 
in Judge Franco’s remarks about Argentina, where the constitutional 
status of human rights treaties made a big difference.  So perhaps, as 
we start to accumulate “lessons learned,” we may want to work into 
our agenda the importance of working to enhance the domestic 
status of human rights treaties. 
 
I think we have a few minutes for questions.  Let me first begin, 
though, by asking our panelists if any of them either wants to ask a 
question of another panelist or has further comments that he or she 
would like to make. 
****** 
Felipe González:  I would like to add a point about the reciprocal 
influences of the Inter-American system or the UN system regarding 
impunity, which I just briefly mentioned before.  Because, in fact, in 
the recent decisions by the Inter-American Commission and Court 
regarding amnesty laws, or—more generally—impunity, they rely a 
lot on the developments of the ICC and the International Criminal 
Courts for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  So there is a strong 
link between the jurisprudence of the Inter-American system and that 
of these UN established tribunals. 
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In addition, on the issue of forced disappearance of persons, there 
was strong feedback on that matter.  For instance, there was a famous 
visit of the Inter-American Commission to Argentina in 1979 where 
the Commission discovered the clandestine prisoners who were about 
to be disappeared and killed at some point.  That prompted the UN 
to establish a working group on this matter.  And later, the 
Commission, in the mid to late 1980s, drafted a project for an Inter-
American Convention on Forced Disappearances23 that prompted the 
UN to move forward toward a UN declaration on this matter. 
In the end, the UN declaration was adopted before the Inter-
American Convention, so it was really a feedback on that matter.  In 
the end, the developments of the Inter-American system led also to 
the adoption of UN Convention of Forced Disappearances at the 
UN.24  These are only a few examples of this feedback among the 
systems. 
****** 
Diane Orentlicher:  One question that I wanted to ask is prompted in 
part by Felipe’s last observation.  I would be interested in hearing 
your thoughts on how the ICC might complement the work of the 
Inter-American human rights system in situations where both systems 
are involved in a particular country.  There are a number of ways 
where questions might arise or where there might be helpful 
synergies in terms of questions arising. 
For instance, when the ICC is looking at the situation in Colombia 
at a time when the Inter-American Commission and Court are also 
looking at it, does the ICC step aside and wait until the case has 
worked its way through the Inter-American system in the hope that 
there may be an effective remedy or an increasingly effective 
response to the decisions of the Inter-American body?  Or is that an 
inappropriate approach?  Should there be synergies?  Also, if anybody 
wants to address this question, perhaps there are other ways the ICC, 
in addition to those Felipe mentioned, might benefit from the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American system, and other systems as 
well, in applying its complementarity analysis.  For example, would 
the ICC find something useful in the analysis of these bodies about 
whether domestic systems have satisfied the exhaustion requirement 
                                                 
 23. Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention on Forced 
Disappearance of Persons, June 9, 1994, 33 ILM 1529. 
 24. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, G.A. Res. 61/177, 20 Dec. 2006, A/Res/61/177; 14 IHRR 582 
(2007). 
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or provided an adequate remedy domestically when it considers 
whether its own complementarity standard has been satisfied? 
 I ask these questions in part because of the experience that Felipe 
and a few others have noted where human rights bodies were at risk 
of going wobbly on certain issues.  These bodies were made aware of 
the fact that other bodies, other experts, and other human rights 
mechanisms were looking at the same issue and perhaps about to 
come out with an opinion that was more progressive than the one 
they were thinking of adopting.  This inspired perhaps greater 
courage and boldness that we might not otherwise have seen from 
the bodies that were looking to see what their neighbors were doing.  
So with that in mind, is that a dynamic that can be exploited in the 
African system, now that we see a dynamic of increasing options? 
****** 
Leonardo Franco:  With regard to the question of the competence of 
the ICC, allow me to make reference to the more general question of 
the relationship between human rights and humanitarian law.  It is 
an important question for the Court since, quite often, situations that 
lead to petitions before the Court via the Commission in fact are 
related to humanitarian problems.  The question then turns into the 
role of the Court in those cases. 
The Inter-American Court, as an organ of supervision of the 
Convention and other Inter-American treaties, has not declared 
violations of international humanitarian law treaties, strictu sensu 
speaking.  This was particularly established in the case of Las Palmeras 
v. Colombia,25 in which the Inter-American Commission requested that 
the Tribunal declare the violation of the right to life as recognized 
under Article 4 of the Convention and Article 3 common of the 
Geneva Conventions.  The ICC decided that the Inter-American 
system organs cannot declare such violations, as they had no 
competence to do it.  However, and this is the most important 
feature, the Tribunal established that relevant provisions of the 
Geneva treaties may be taken into account as criteria of 
interpretation of the Convention.  This idea has since been reiterated 
in several cases.  So the Court has served itself of International 
Humanitarian Law (“IHL”) in order to analyze and conceptualize the 
state obligations to protect and guarantee the exercise of several 
rights. 
                                                 
 25. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 96 (Nov. 26, 2002). 
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The Court has observed the existence of general and special state 
obligations to protect civilian populations and vulnerable groups—
internally displaced persons, children, etc.—in situations of internal 
or international armed conflict, as well as in cases related to the use 
of force and suspension of guarantees, regarding internal violence 
and conflicts, states of emergency, actions against terrorism, social 
protest, and other exceptional situations, even in times of peace.  The 
Court recognized certain non-derogable provisions in such cases.  
The Court has even considered IHL provisions when it has ordered 
provisional measures of protection of certain communities in armed 
conflict situation, and when it has directed the states to adapt 
domestic law to IHL or to conduct programs of education in IHL for 
their public servants. 
All those cases show that, nowadays, we see a convergence and 
complementarity between international law of human rights and 
international humanitarian law.  Therefore, the two value systems 
coexist.  How can the coexistence of these systems lead to justice?  
The two systems are necessary, fundamental, and a very good road to 
peace-building.  The question that has been posed in the past and the 
present, in Latin America as well as in Africa—let me remind you of 
Sudan—is the relation between the search for peace and the 
promotion and protection of human rights violations committed in 
the past.  Perhaps in Central America, there are many cases of the 
two objectives complementing each other.  In my experience 
regarding Sudan, where it was very difficult—not with Sudanese 
people but with the UN in New York—the answer was, “First we will 
have peace; then we will see.”  I think this solution does not help.  
Those processes are necessarily complementary and simultaneous. 
****** 
Felipe González:  Regarding the first question that Diane posed, I 
think that the role of the ICC and the role of the Inter-American 
system are fully complementary.  The nature of these bodies is 
completely different, so they complement each other.  The very name 
of the ICC says it is a criminal tribunal, which is not the case for the 
Inter-American Court or the Commission, which is a semi-judicial 
body and only establishes the responsibilities that states may have in 
some situations. 
In addition to that, I would say that, in addition to the work on the 
specific cases, the Inter-American Commission has a broad mandate 
which includes the possibility of preparing reports—country reports, 
thematic reports—based on in-country visits.  So that is also a role 
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different from that of the ICC.  And as for the options, I think it is a 
difference as well because there is no way for a citizen as such to go to 
the ICC, but instead they can go to the Commission directly. 
****** 
Andrew Drzemczewski:  I have a question to the panelists on the issue 
of “impunity.”  Reference has been made to “state responsibility” for 
impunity.  But what is the responsibility of international actors in this 
respect?  Permit me to explain.  The European Court refused to deal 
with cases brought by individual applicants against states’ parties to 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), in a situation 
where—within the scope of military action—member states of NATO 
and the UN had allegedly committed serious human rights violations 
(Bankovic v. Belgium,26 Behrami v. France27 cases).  This meant that the 
individuals were, in effect, prevented from arguing the merits of their 
claims before the Strasbourg Court.  Does this not suggest that, when 
major human rights violations have allegedly been committed by 
international actors—say, in a hypothetical case, by KFOR or UNMIK 
in Kosovo—the said actors cannot be held responsible for their 
action before an international human rights body?  This concerns the 
issue of impunity/immunity of international actors who may 
circumvent responsibility for human rights violations.  Should not the 
reasoning developed with respect to state responsibility—concerning 
the eradication of impunity—not be extended to that of international 
organizations and actors? 
And I ask this question accidentally-on-purpose, knowing that one 
of the persons on the panel is preparing a report on “impunity” for 
the UN right now.  Thank you. 
****** 
Diane Orentlicher:  I have just one comment.  I believe that there was 
a decision about a month or so ago in the Netherlands in which a 
court concluded that members of the Dutch battalion at Srebrenica 
could not be prosecuted at all, whether or not a prosecution would 
lead to a conviction.  The court ruled that as soldiers serving under 
the UN banner, members of the Dutch battalion enjoyed the 
immunity conferred on them under the applicable status of forces 
agreement or other UN principles of immunity.  So either way, they 
                                                 
 26. 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333. 
 27. 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 85 (2007). 
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were immune, but both doctrines pointed to some other theory in 
which they could be held accountable. 
And so perhaps I can react by drawing on a point made earlier 
about how we begin to tackle situations where the challenge of 
impunity is so great it is hard to even find your way in.  There does 
seem to be now growing publicity and public concern about this 
practice which, as you have noted, has prompted the UN itself to 
study the problem and try to find a handle on it.  Perhaps that is the 
first stage toward finding a more effective way to crack the impunity 
that leads to serious abuses by UN forces and others, which is a 
horrible shame that has to be addressed. 
 
I want to close with two related conclusions that emerged from this 
panel, which are perhaps a foundation for further development of 
work in this area. 
First, a point that was forcefully brought home by this panel is that 
these battles against impunity take a long time.  Something that I 
thought was quite heartening from the presentations by those 
involved in the Inter-American system is to see the progress over 
decades since the disheartening situation in which the positive 
decisions by the Inter-American Commission, as Felipe noted at the 
start of this panel, seemed at the time to be just words, and people 
thought that they were not going to take root.  Then we heard from 
other speakers about the Argentine courts, where the Argentina 
Supreme Court has used the case law of the Inter-American system, 
including a case involving another country, not Argentina itself, to 
annul amnesties with retroactive effect.  This shows an enormous 
amount of progress.  So the struggle against impunity is one that will 
take a long time, and it is an ongoing challenge.  Even when you 
think you have won some victories, you have to take the struggle to 
the next step. 
This brings me to a final observation relating to perhaps the 
foundation for renewed efforts in various arenas.  I was also struck by 
the profound importance of domesticating the victories one achieves 
before regional human rights bodies.  I think this point leads us to 
the subject of the next panel:  When you win a victory in one of these 
regional or international courts, it by no means translates 
automatically into effective action at the national level.  Concerted 
efforts are needed to do that. 
One of the significant lessons learned is that if treaties have 
constitutional status, or somehow in domestic law are more readily 
translated into effective incorporation, it makes a big difference to 
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their enforcement by domestic courts.  Related to that point, there 
has been an enormous amount of sharing of jurisprudence across 
regional and international bodies, which has had a really important 
influence in advancing the jurisprudence of these bodies.  But those 
of us who work in this area recognize that in many ways a lot of the 
key action is now occurring in the national courts.  And again, to cite 
examples from this panel, the decisions of the Argentine courts, 
some decisions of the courts in Colombia, and those of other national 
courts have been really important precedents that have inspired 
countries in other areas, other regions, as well as in neighboring 
countries, to do better than they might otherwise have done.  But we 
have more of a language barrier in sharing that jurisprudence than 
we have in sharing jurisprudence among human rights treaty bodies, 
and I am aware of some efforts to try to overcome this. 
I do not want to extend this any longer because we are already well 
over time, but I do want to thank an extraordinary panel for bringing 
rich insights and expertise to this discussion.  Thank you. 
II. PANEL 2:  THE SCOPE OF REPARATIONS:  CHALLENGES  
IN DEFINING THEIR SCOPE AND GUARANTEEING THEIR ENFORCEMENT 
  
Claudio Grossman:  First of all, I want to welcome the panelists and 
thank them for their presence.  They are a unique body of scholars 
and experts, and we look forward to an exchange of views on the 
three different systems.  We have agreed that we are going to first 
discuss the Inter-American system, then the African system, and, 
finally, the European system. 
A. Sergio García Ramírez28 
Ten minutes is not a lot of time for such a big issue.  But I want to 
take a few minutes to say thank you for the generous invitation by the 
Washington College of Law, the Dean, who is my friend, and those who 
made this discussion possible.  The topic of my brief speech and the 
topic of the panel is reparations—which is certainly a fundamental 
and crucial issue.  Obviously, if there are no reparations as a 
consequence of illicit conduct, there is no judicial security, no justice; 
and impunity will prevail.  Also, demonstrating the lack and inefficacy 
of reparations will push the protection of rights in general into a 
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crisis.  It is worth noting that the lack of penal prosecution is not the 
only form of impunity.  We often say that impunity occurs when the 
individual who committed the crime is not sanctioned.  But impunity 
can also come in the form of avoiding an order for reparations, 
causing reparations to become an illusory remedy. 
The enormous burden and enormous importance of reparations as 
a way to restore rights—the objective of judicial order—is to create 
conditions that allow for the creation and development of human 
relations, and to compensate the victim for the violation he suffered.  
Reparations are the natural expectation of the victim, the natural 
expectation of society, and the natural expectation of the state 
because they involve not only a judicial duty, but also an ethical and 
political duty. 
In the case of the Inter-American system, we need to study the core 
questions of reparations in order to understand fully the trebled 
expectation and the trebled context.  First, we should study the 
international development of reparations and how reparations 
developed in the Inter-American system vis-à-vis this international 
development.  Although the Inter-American system is based on 
European examples, the American result is certainly different from 
the European result.  Second, we should study the application of the 
system of reparations and the reality of how it operates—particularly 
given the circumstances and conditions of the Latin American 
political, historical, and cultural context.  And, lastly, we should focus 
on the formation of the rule.  I believe this element is very important 
because it follows the path of the rule from the past to the present 
and into the future.  We should study the famous brief precursor to 
Article 63 of the American Convention from before, during, and after 
the conference that gave rise to the American Convention.  This tiny 
fertile precursor, born in the first version of Article 63, was closely 
tied to the European system.  It looked very much toward Europe in 
its development, but it finally reached a conclusion of its own on a 
different path from the European system of reparations.  I am not 
saying it is worse; I am not saying it is better; I am saying that it is 
simply different. 
When the San Jose Conference arrived, projects were presented to 
the Inter-American Commission such as the project of judicial-
consulting and the Chile-Uruguay project involving a version of a 
reparations system very similar to that of the European Convention of 
1950 (“European Convention”).  The proposed Chile-Uruguay 
reparations system was more or less a profoundly modified version of 
the text of the European Convention.  The Guatemalan proposal at 
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the Conference introduced the language that would later become 
Article 63.  Article 63 laid out the framework for compensation as 
well as actual and future guarantees of reparations.  For this reason, 
in my work, I refer to the broad horizon of the Inter-American 
system, while the European system is narrower.  The European system 
puts its trust in national laws.  When the European Court verifies the 
existence or lack of a violation, it refers the case back to the national 
system, unless the national system cannot fully repair the 
consequences of the violation.  In contrast, the Inter-American 
system, for various reasons, did not trust the national systems.  The 
Inter-American system put more trust in the international system and 
gave the Inter-American Court the opportunity, necessity, and 
mandate to dictate the reparations rather than merely referring the 
issue back to national jurisdictions.  That is how the Court has 
worked.  There are only a handful of cases—which could be 
summarized on the fingers of two hands—that the Court has referred 
back to national jurisdictions, sometimes with good results and 
sometimes with results that were not as good. 
I would highlight the following fact:  the Inter-American Court’s 
interpretation of the reparations system was created in a short 
amount of time.  The Court has been around for less than three 
decades, and the number of decisions it has issued has been relatively 
small.  I am not saying that the number of decisions has been 
insufficient; rather, I am saying they have been relatively limited.  The 
Court arrived at decisions in a very short amount of time from the 
date of its inception, and the Court always decided cases within its 
authority but without a pro-person, pro hominem slant.  The Court 
decided cases without allowing imagination to run too wild, but at the 
same time opening up possibilities of interpretation in order to avoid 
the complete immobility of the rules.  With an awareness—which I 
would consider reasonable—of the circumstances of the Inter-
American system, decisions were made with a strong emphasis on the 
source of the violation, the individual act, the concrete individual, the 
agent or the state, and on the law.  The decision, or the process of 
arriving at the decision, allowed for an attack on the violation by way 
of its source.  As a result, the reparation generally has a reach that 
goes much further than you would expect if you were to restrict the 
case to the particular victim.  This approach lends itself to 
consistency, or an aspiration of idealism and consistency.  I am not 
trying to say, however, that this will always be the scope of the 
reparations ordered by the Court, which are varied and involve quite 
creative jurisprudence. 
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This leads me to another characteristic of the Inter-American 
system as a whole—the renovation of the Inter-American system 
through a decisive turn, which occurred in the third decision issued 
by the Inter-American Court.  This decision spoke to compensation 
and reparation, and it opened up the space to move forward toward 
reparations in general.  Of course there have been many obstacles in 
the path of moving towards a system of reparations:  reticence, or 
political or judicial resistance (which is political at its root), such as 
high costs, problems of proof, complexities, and delays.  In the face 
of these obstacles, the Court modified its regulations and, above all, 
its policies to better impart justice.  The Court’s ability of “self-
compensation” also played an important role with regard to 
reparations, because it allowed for alternative solutions or results to 
the traditional remedies.  Compensation is malleable, and the 
foundation of reparations is also malleable to a certain point, but 
only to the point permissible in each situation.  But it is a guarantee 
for the system and for the people to never remove knowledge of the 
case—what is going on and what should occur—from the Inter-
American community, which is aware and alert. 
In addition to emphasizing compensation for damages, I would 
like to note that there are at least thirty varieties of different 
reparations that the Inter-American Court can order.  These 
reparations are perfectly reasonable given Articles 1.1, 2, and 73.1, 
which require or order states to fulfill obligations that are unfulfilled.  
By failing to do so, states are also in violation of the Convention, 
which also requires further reparations.  These varieties and other 
disciplinary actions or instruments of reparations are those that make 
up the doctrine of reparations of the Court.  Generally, states, which 
are sometimes bellicose with regard to the amount of compensation 
required, have peacefully accepted the general idea, nature, and 
existence of reparations over the last thirty years. 
The Inter-American Court can directly mandate constitutional 
modifications, and although they are not directly enforced, 
reparations are available for the Court to impose.  The Court can 
even impose housing programs, relocation programs for the 
displaced, education and health projects, revision of trial processes, 
suppression, and more.  In other words, this has been the most 
constructive and most realistic aspect of the Court.  I consider it the 
most realistic because, step–by–step, the Court’s policies have soaked 
through to the underlying national systems and policies. 
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B. Manuel Ventura Robles29 
I am very honored to be here with you this morning.  I want to 
thank Claudio Grossman for having me here today.  In a decision 
that was issued a few years ago in the case of Caesar v. Trinidad and 
Tobago,30 one of the Court’s findings stated that Article 75 of the 
American Convention has a gap.  The gap arose because, although 
the Court is required to inform the General Assembly of the OAS of 
non-compliance with decisions, there was no institutional process 
established within the same organization to do so.  It has been 
established that the General Assembly, the highest political body in 
the organization, does not deal with or consider non-compliance of 
decisions issued by the Court.  Do you believe that it is right, given 
the level of evolution that the Inter-American system has achieved, 
that when the Court informs the General Assembly of the OAS of 
non-compliance, the General Assembly’s resolution does not 
mention such non-compliance?  Is this right, considering that Article 
68 of the American Convention stipulates that states that are parties 
to a case have the obligation to comply with the decisions?  Do you 
believe that it is right that no mention is made of the Court’s report 
identifying that a specific state did not comply with the decision of 
the Tribunal?  And there is no debate about this? 
This is the main issue that will, at some point, have to be addressed 
in the OAS because there is an entire process that has brought us to 
this point.  The first stage of the process was no more than issuing the 
first decisions by the Inter-American Court.  One example is the case 
against Honduras for forced disappearances in which there was a 
devaluation of the Honduran currency at the moment the decision 
and the resulting reparations and compensatory damages were 
announced.  Honduras alleged that they were to pay in their 
domestic currency, and the victims wanted their award revalued.  
Consequently, they asked for an interpretation of the decision, and 
Honduras complied a few years later.  But in the meantime, the 
Tribunal went to the General Assembly of the OAS in Santiago, Chile 
to ask that the General Assembly put pressure on Honduras to report 
regarding non-compliance with the decision.  Not one state—neither 
the states that are parties to the Convention nor any state member of 
the OAS—backed this request from the Court. 
                                                 
   29. Judge, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Organization of American 
States.  The views expressed are those of the speaker and do not necessarily reflect 
those of the Commission or the OAS. 
 30. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 123 (Mar. 11, 2005). 
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That was in 1991.  In 1995, the complete opposite occurred.  The 
Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs of the OAS (“CJPA”) 
urged Suriname to report to the Court regarding the non-
compliance of a decision in the case of Gangaram Panday.31  Once the 
General Assembly approved the resolution, the state reported 
immediately regarding compliance with the decision. 
The real crisis of this system occurred at the beginning of the 
current century, when the Court issued the decision regarding the 
death penalty against Trinidad and Tobago.  Trinidad and Tobago 
refused to report to the Court regarding compliance with the 
decision and with the provisional measures of the Court.  The Court 
turned to the General Assembly again and informed them of the non-
compliance.  Absolutely nothing happened.  The CJPA, the 
Permanent Council, and the General Assembly did nothing. 
What the CJPA approved was a general text, as I mentioned earlier, 
stating that the states have the general obligation to comply with the 
decisions of the cases to which they are parties.  The general text 
does not mention the state, nor does it mention the case.  This 
situation—which has not fundamentally evolved—arrived at a second 
stage when Panama, interpreting the decision in the case of Baena 
Ricardo et al. v. Panamá,32  asserted to the Tribunal that the Court did 
not have jurisdiction to request information from the states in the 
oversight stages of compliance with the decision.  The Court, in a 
well-known decision, asserted its jurisdiction and determined that the 
Court has the ability to request information from the state regarding 
the implementation of the decision, precisely in order to inform the 
General Assembly in the Court’s annual report as to whether there 
has been compliance with its decisions. 
With this clarification at the beginning of the current decade, the 
Inter-American Court began an extremely important stage by 
deciding to not make categorical decisions as to whether there was 
compliance once the deadline for the state to comply had passed.  
Instead, the Court will proceed gradually to determine whether the 
state has complied with the decision and will partially close the case 
as the state complies with each obligation.  There are a great number 
of partially closed cases—those in which the state has only partially 
complied with the decision—that can be viewed in the annual report.  
Generally, the states quickly and satisfactorily comply with the 
payment of reparation sums and, when it is possible, the restoration 
                                                 
 31. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 12 (Jan. 21, 1994). 
 32. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 72 (Feb. 2, 2001). 
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of rights, etc.  But where the Inter-American system has not advanced 
with regard to human rights is in the investigation and indictment of 
those responsible for violations by domestic jurisdictions.  This is the 
reason, possibly, why things do not always advance when a case gets to 
the CJPA, or when a report of non-compliance is written.  Some 
reasons, such as a lack of political will, do not allow a state to carry 
out an investigation further than it has already been brought.  In my 
opinion, this is something that should be determined precisely in the 
political sphere once the case leaves the hands of the Court and once 
non-compliance has been declared. 
I hope that someday the CJPA or a working group will look into the 
state of the victims of the Inter-American Commission and of the 
Court and make a determination or recommendation to the General 
Assembly that allows the Court to definitively close the case from the 
list of pending cases.  Thank you. 
C. Elizabeth Abi-Mershed33 
Thank you very much.  It is really a pleasure to be here with you 
today.  I am going to speak a little bit about reparations, compliance, 
and the Inter-American Commission.34  As you have heard, in the 
Inter-American system, we often highlight the case system as being 
very important because it provides a means to concretize what 
otherwise abstract rights mean in practice.  Through the cases, a 
person can understand what their rights mean, and states can 
understand what actions they have to prioritize to be in compliance 
with their human rights obligations.  Reparations, in turn, serve to 
crystallize what is required of the state.  Reparations, when 
implemented, show the difference that international human rights 
law makes in the lives of individuals. 
What do reparations look like in cases resolved by the Inter-
American Commission?  As I mentioned, I am going to focus on the 
case system as the most concrete way of seeing the relationship 
between state obligation, a breach of that obligation, and the 
measures necessary to remedy the breach.  Without going too much 
into the procedural aspects, as you know, the individual case system 
before the Commission produces two possible results.  One is the 
resolution of a case through a friendly settlement, in which the 
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parties reach an agreement and the state undertakes to carry out a 
series of measures to implement that agreement.  Alternatively, if 
such a settlement is not reached, the Commission will issue a merits 
report that, if a violation has been established, will include a series of 
recommendations directed to the state in question.  In both of those 
situations, the Commission will then initiate a follow-up process to 
monitor compliance with what the state is required to do to discharge 
its obligations. 
I want to differentiate between the Inter-American Commission 
and the Inter-American Court.  The Court has Convention-based 
authority to issue orders, including those for the payment of 
compensation as well as for other forms of reparation, and member 
states that have accepted the Court’s contentious jurisdiction 
expressly commit themselves to implement its decisions.  The 
Commission, on the other hand, issues recommendations derived 
from its more general Charter and Convention-based mandate.  I 
want to make it clear that, as a matter of international treaty law, 
states are obliged to use good faith to comply with those 
recommendations.  Accordingly, in the final resolution of a case 
through a merits report, the Commission will have issued a series of 
recommendations that the state concerned is required to implement. 
The recommendations would usually include the investigation, 
prosecution, and punishment of those responsible for actually 
perpetrating the violation.  They would probably include fair 
compensation for the victims and might very well include legislative 
policy or other measures aimed at ensuring the non-repetition of the 
violations, as well as the correction of structural problems.  The state 
then has to report back on the measures it has taken to comply.  If 
the state has fully complied with all of the recommendations, then 
the Inter-American Commission may deem the matter resolved.  Full 
compliance remains disturbingly rare.  If there has not been full 
compliance, then the Commission decides to either publish the 
report or send the case to the Inter-American Court.  Given that you 
have heard today from several judges of the Court, I am going to 
speak about those final friendly settlements or merits reports that the 
Commission publishes and thereafter supervises through its follow-up 
procedures. 
One of the points that I want to make today as part of this cross-
regional dialogue is that the Inter-American Commission now has a 
defined follow-up procedure, and this was not always the case.  When 
the Commission adopted significant changes to its Rules of 
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Procedure in 2001, it included an express follow-up procedure.35  The 
idea, from the Commission’s point of view, was that it would be 
sending more cases to the Inter-American Court, but for those cases 
that remained before it for final resolution, the Commission had to 
find more and better ways of moving forward on compliance with its 
recommendations.  As from 2001, the Commission publishes a table 
in its annual report that deals with compliance with friendly 
settlement agreements and merits reports.  The table is divided into 
three categories:  full compliance, partial compliance, and pending 
compliance. 
This categorization reflects some of the ideas underlying the 
follow-up process as a whole—ideas that include patience and 
persistence.  Experience within the system indicates that a state may 
be required to take many actions in order to fully implement 
recommendations, and that such actions may require time and imply 
a dynamic process that evolves.  There may need to be some space to 
see that those actions come to full fruition, so the Inter-American 
Commission continues to monitor the state over the years.  In fact, all 
of the cases that the Commission started monitoring in 2001—cases 
from 2000 and forward—we are monitoring now. 
What do we do in the follow-up process?  The Inter-American 
Commission asks for information from the parties, from the state and 
the petitioner, to be able to contrast and compare the perspectives on 
what has been done to implement the recommendations and what 
remains to be done.  We transmit information between the parties.  
The Commission also has the ability to hold working meetings or 
hearings.  In fact, we are having a hearing during this upcoming 
period of sessions on compliance with the recommendations in an 
individual case.  In some cases, the issue of compliance can be 
incorporated into the agenda of working visits to enable the 
Commission to converse with the authorities of the state about what is 
being done or what needs to be done. 
The point I want to emphasize is that having a defined procedure 
has made a difference in making the compliance phase—which, at 
the end of the day, is the most important phase—more visible and 
concrete.  The procedure makes the issue of compliance more 
present in the agenda of the system and its users, and this has 
produced some positive results. 
                                                 
 35. Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
Art. 46, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-
American System, OAS/ser.C/V/I4 Rev. 12 (2007). 
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The results of the follow-up procedure can also tell us some things 
about how we are doing with compliance in general.  If we look at the 
cases that the Inter-American Commission has reported on in this 
follow-up process—covering reports adopted between 2000 until 
2006, and leaving aside the cases that went to the Inter-American 
Court—these would include sixty merits reports and fifty-three 
friendly settlement reports, or a total of 113 cases in the follow-up 
process to date.36  Of that total, there has been full compliance with 
reparations in twelve cases, partial compliance in seventy-four, and 
compliance is pending in twenty-seven.  Picking up on the theme that 
Judge Ventura Robles mentioned, partial compliance is the name of 
the game, being the more common result.  Fifteen years ago or so, 
there would have been very little compliance to discuss in terms of 
the cases decided by the Commission.  At present, we have partial 
compliance in a great many cases, and that partial compliance has 
had a tremendous impact in those cases. 
I think it is relevant to mention that in terms of tendencies, one 
can see that compliance with friendly settlement agreements is much 
higher than compliance with merits reports issued by the Inter-
American Commission.  That may be a natural consequence of the 
process of negotiation and confidence building and the taking of 
steps toward a friendly settlement. 
I want to move on to a few observations about what the process 
shows in terms of the concrete results of the cases resolved by the 
Inter-American Commission.  The first point has to do with 
compensation.  While the individual case process is not about the 
money for most people, money can be extremely important for both 
practical and symbolic reasons.  It is important for transmitting the 
question of state liability to the citizenry through the taxing power.  If 
the citizens have to pay for violations of human rights, the idea is that 
they will be more aware, and they will require more accountability 
from their officials.  So it may have an impact structurally as well. 
What we can see from the follow-up process before the Inter-
American Commission, in terms of both merits and friendly 
settlement reports, is that victims have received over six million 
dollars in compensation during the five or six years that we have been 
engaged in this form of reporting.  Compensation has also been 
given in the form of homes, scholarships, annuities, health care, and 
pensions.  Following up on a point that was made by the judges of the 
                                                 
 36.  This information is based on a review of material published in the Annual 
Report of the IACHR 2007, chapter III, follow up, and is available at 
http://www.cidh.org/. 
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Inter-American Court, the highest rate of state compliance is with 
measures related to compensation.  In just about half of the 
Commission cases in follow-up, the victims have received full or 
partial monetary compensation. 
The next point concerns legislation, as the Inter-American 
Commission frequently recommends reforms in this area.  In more 
than half of its merits reports, the Commission recommended some 
kind of change in legislation.  The rate of compliance with these 
recommendations is much lower than it is with compensation.  While 
the absolute number of changes adopted is lower, the impact of the 
measures adopted has in some cases been dramatic.  For example, we 
could mention the case of Maria da Penha v. Brazil,37 which was the 
first case about the state responsibility vis-à-vis domestic violence.  
One of the recommendations had to do with legislative reforms.  
Through the follow-up process, the case remained visible, and it took 
a number of years before the state finally adopted the legislative 
changes.  Finally, in 2006, Brazil adopted a new law against domestic 
violence called the “Maria da Penha” law—named after the victim in 
this case.  The new law represents a tremendous advance in terms of 
the legislative framework and protection. 
We could also look at the dialogue, if you will, between the system 
and several countries in the Caribbean about the mandatory 
imposition of the death penalty for certain classes of crimes.  
Through the cases and the recommendations, and through the 
dialogue between the national courts and the Inter-American Court 
as well as with courts beyond the Inter-American system, one can see 
a very important change over time whereby a number of countries 
have modified the legislative framework applicable to the death 
penalty.  We can also see a change in the juvenile death penalty vis-à-
vis a series of cases with respect to the United States, subsequent to 
which the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the imposition of the 
penalty in cases involving persons who were juveniles when they 
committed their crimes.38  In terms of investigation, prosecution, and 
punishment, it is a very frequent recommendation and it is very 
infrequently complied with.  Judge Ventura Robles already spoke 
                                                 
 37. Case 12.051, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 54/01, OEA/ser.L/V/II.111, 
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Supreme Court ruling are Report 62/02, merits, case 12.285, Michael Domingues, 
United States, October 22, 2002, in Annual Report of the IACHR 2002; Report 
101/03, case 12.412, Napoleon Beazley, United States, December 29, 2003, in Annual 
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http://www.cidh.org/. 
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about that insofar as the work of the Court is concerned.  In terms of 
symbolic reparations or guarantees of non-repetition, the kinds of 
recommendations and actions we see through Commission cases 
would include recognition of responsibility, dedication of streets, 
parks, or monuments, and the passage of measures such as increased 
training for officials. 
There are a number of other things that we could discuss about 
reparations and compliance in the Inter-American system, but there 
are two points on which I want to close.  One is to follow up on the 
point that the engagement of member states in the process is clearly 
crucial, not only individually vis-à-vis their own cases, but also 
collectively through their participation in the political organs of the 
OAS.  The idea is raised every once in a while that there should be 
some kind of mechanism through the political organs to supervise 
compliance, but up until now that has not assumed a concrete form.   
The final theme would be that we have seen a number of really 
important advances in the systems:  the sending of more cases to the 
Inter-American Court and the further incorporation of the voice of 
the victim in the process.  I really think that the next thing we need to 
see for a major advance in the system is a legal aid system.  If you look 
at who has access to reparations, you are looking at who has access to 
the system.  And until the Inter-American system has a functioning 
legal aid system and a fully funded set of organs—Commission and 
Court—it will be difficult to advance further with the question of 
access to the system and the resolution of past human rights 
violations.  Thank you. 
D. Claudio Grossman  
As we move into the African system, different issues become 
relevant for comparison—for example, the concept of victim.  In 
addition, the issue of reparations—their scope and elements—is 
crucial for human rights law.  The Inter-American system offers a very 
broad system of reparations that include material and moral 
damages, measures of non-repetition, changes in legislation, and 
symbolic reparations.  Because of the scope of these measures, the 
Inter-American system has developed the most comprehensive system 
of reparations currently in force in international human rights law.  
Needless to say, it would be interesting to hear about the African 
experience in this area and to see whether there is a different 
emphasis as a result of the specific regional conditions—for example, 
group rights as well as economic, social, and cultural rights, etc. 
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As Elizabeth was mentioning, it is important to note that there is a 
high degree of participation by both victims and states in the Inter-
American system.  However, there is a higher level of compliance 
with friendly settlements than with Inter-American Court decisions.  
This is not surprising given the high involvement of the parties in the 
negotiations that lead to a settlement.  Court decisions are mostly 
complied with in matters of payment.  It becomes important to study 
the Inter-American experience when ensuring compliance with other 
components of integral reparation, particularly investigation and 
punishment of those responsible for human rights violations.  Again, 
the African experience would be extremely relevant for comparative 
purposes. 
In recent years, the Inter-American system—the Commission and 
the Court—has developed a system to follow up on its past decisions, 
commitments, and friendly settlements.  Pursuant to this new system, 
past decisions now remain on the docket of the Commission and the 
Court until they are fully complied with.  The Commission and Court 
schedule hearings on compliance allowing both the petitioners and 
the states to express their views.  Then, the supervisory organs report 
on the status of compliance to the OAS.  Unfortunately, the political 
organs have not fully exercised their role as guarantors of the system.  
In fact, the General Assembly does little more than acknowledge the 
Reports from the Commission and Court.  Further development of 
the system would require these organs to stop standing idle in the 
face of non-compliance.  In order to move in that direction, steps we 
should consider include, for example, individualized discussions 
concerning states that fail to comply with Commission and Court 
decisions.  Sharing experiences with other regional systems enriches 
our analysis of the political and legal issues involved. 
With these brief remarks, let us now hear from the African system.  
I give the floor to Commissioner Nyanduga from the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African Commission”). 
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E. Bahame Tom Mukirya Nyanduga39 
Let me first of all thank the Washington College of Law, the 
MacArthur Foundation, and the Inter-American human rights system 
for extending an invitation to me and to the African Commission to 
participate in this conference on regional human rights systems.  At 
this juncture, let me also extend the apologies of my colleagues who 
could not make it here today.  Looking at the issue of remedies and 
the challenges to implementation, and listening to the presentations 
this morning, I thought I would change my presentation to first 
describe the challenges that the African system has been facing in 
terms of effecting remedies and implementing recommendations. 
The African regional system is currently in evolution.  This is a 
system whose centerpiece is the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (“African Charter”), which established the African 
Commission in 1987.  The African Commission has now been in 
existence for the last twenty-one years; in fact, tomorrow, the twenty-
first of October, we begin the twenty-second anniversary of the 
formation of African Commission.  That day is marked by the African 
Commission as African Human Rights day.  All fifty-three member 
states of the African Union have ratified the African Charter.  The 
African Charter was developed and adopted by African states during 
the era of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).  However, at 
that time, we saw in Africa that the existence of the OAU was also 
marked by many human rights challenges, particularly in term of 
governance issues—mainly lack of respect for human rights and 
democratic principles. 
Around the year 2001, upon the entry into force of the Constitutive 
Act of the African Union, we see the establishment of a new 
organization on the continent:  the African Union.  Within the 
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East African Law Society, (2004–06), the national and regional bar associations 
respectively. 
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Constitutive Act itself, which is the legal instrument establishing the 
African Union, there are key principles that introduce on the 
continent a new human rights architecture and a new disposition 
towards respect for human rights.  And this is what we say:  
henceforth, the African Union and its member states have taken on 
board the issue of ensuring respect for democratic principles and 
respect for the rule of law, human rights, and good governance.  
Africa is reconstructing a continent respectful of the human rights of 
its people.  And we believe, in so doing, in the long run it will 
enhance the demonstration of a human rights culture on the 
continent. 
This legal construction is broadly reflected in two key articles, 
namely Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitutive Act, which outline the 
objectives and principles of the African Union.  Of these articles, one 
states that the African Union itself and its members shall respect 
human rights on the continent in accordance with the terms of the 
African Charter.  The Act provides for different organs and 
institutions to guide the Union in carrying out its functions.  It 
includes a number of new principles to mark a paradigm shift from 
the previous organization—for instance, issues such as establishing 
the principle of interference in a member state in a situation of 
serious, grave, or massive violations of human rights on the 
continent.  And this is distinct from the principle of absolute 
sovereignty, which previously led to the glorification of the principle 
of non-interference in the internal affairs of African states during the 
era of the OAU. 
A few other concepts have been introduced into the Constitutive 
Act.  For instance, the principle of elimination of gender inequality 
has actually brought the issue of ensuring that the rights of women 
are protected in Africa to the forefront.  Another concept that will 
have an impact is the principle of condemnation and the rejection of 
access to power through unconstitutional means.  Now, another 
aspect that is central to the establishment of a culture of human 
rights on the continent has been the move towards the adoption of a 
number of human rights instruments.  For instance, the protocol on 
the establishment of the African Court on Human Rights, which 
entered into force in early 2005, led to the establishment of the 
African Human Rights Court in 2006 and the election of judges.  I 
am pleased to say one of the judges is here today. 
There is now a body that will complement the mandate of the 
African Commission in protecting human rights on the continent.  
Other mechanisms or instruments that have been adopted on the 
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continent include the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa and 
the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of Children.  In 
addition to the court that was mentioned earlier, there is a protocol 
that merges two African courts.  The other court is the Court of 
Justice of the African Union that is now merged to become the Court 
of Justice and Human Rights; the merger protocol was adopted in 
July of this year by the Assembly of the African Union.  This 
description explains the legal instruments and institutional 
mechanisms in place which aim to ensure the implementation of 
remedies, if any, on the continent. 
The experience of the African Commission has shown that one of 
the many challenges to implementing remedies on the continent, as 
mentioned by one of the speakers on the Inter-American system, has 
been that the recommendations of the African Commission are not 
binding.  The African Commission has not undertaken a study on the 
problem of non-implementation to establish the extent to which 
remedies or recommendations have been put into effect where 
violations have been discovered—to what extent have these 
recommendations been implemented.  Other studies, particularly 
those by academic institutions, tend to show that the majority of these 
recommendations have not been implemented.  A study carried out 
by the Center for Human Rights of the University of Pretoria in 
South Africa gave a rough indication of fourteen percent full 
implementation by African states, twenty-six percent partial 
implementation, and about sixty percent of the recommendations 
remaining unimplemented. 
Now this is notwithstanding the general commitment that a state 
party to the African Charter undertakes when it ratifies the African 
Charter.  Article 1 of the Charter obliges a state party to undertake 
various measures—administrative, legislative, and other measures—to 
ensure that the obligations under the African Charter, which they 
assume voluntarily, are implemented.  In terms of follow-up, the 
African Commission, as I see it, has not undertaken any effective 
measures to examine the extent to which its recommendations have 
been implemented.  However, the African Commission has two 
opportunities.  First, when we undertake promotional missions to 
member states to ensure that each member state with an issue 
pending against it has an opportunity to inquire and to examine the 
extent to which that state has complied with the recommendations 
issued by the Commission.  Second, when the states have submitted 
their periodic reports, there is an opportunity for the Commission to 
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examine the state and the extent to which it has implemented 
previous recommendations. 
As I mentioned earlier, the establishment of the African Human 
Rights Court has provided a mechanism for the effective 
implementation of recommendations.  Both the Commission and the 
Court are in the process of harmonizing their new procedures 
through which recommendations are likely to be implemented if the 
Commission brings cases to the court.  The Commission is one of 
those parties, under the protocol that established the Court, which is 
entitled to bring cases to the Court.  However, there are a number of 
constraints on the Commission in spite of the entry into force of the 
protocol establishing the Court.  For example, only one or two states 
so far have ratified the protocol and given the Court the power to 
entertain cases brought by individuals and NGOs. 
This is important because the jurisprudence of the African 
Commission, developed over the past twenty-one years of its 
existence, has developed as result of cases predominantly brought by 
individuals before the Commission.  So, unless many of the states that 
are parties to the protocol give power to the Court, then we are not 
likely to see the court effectively implementing remedies against 
violations on the continent, let alone developing human rights 
jurisprudence on the continent. 
There are some other recommendations, but due to the lack of 
time, I will not be able to go through them.  Nevertheless, it is 
important to emphasize the role of the national human rights 
institutions in the continent which might assist the Commission, 
because within the roughly thirty-six states where they have been 
established, they are likely to be patronized by the African 
Commission to ensure that these recommendations are 
implemented.  Thank you. 
****** 
F. Charlotte de Broutelles40  
The European Convention system is a quite original one because it 
entrusts its executive body, the Committee of Ministers, with 
                                                 
 40. Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs, Department for the 
Execution of the European Court of Human Rights Judgments.  The opinions 
expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not engage the 
responsibility of the Council of Europe.  They should not be regarded as placing 
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binding the governments of member states, the Council of Europe’s statutory organs 
or any organ set up by virtue of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
  
204 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.  59:163 
supervising the implementation of the decisions of its judicial body, 
the European Court.  This is provided for in Article 46, paragraph 2 
of the Convention, which states that “[t]he final judgment of the 
European Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, 
which shall supervise its execution.”41  But to date, there is nothing 
more in the ECHR regarding the implementation of the European 
Court judgments in order to apply the first paragraph of Article 46, 
which states “[c]ontracting [p]arties undertake to abide by the final 
judgment of the European Court in any case to which they are 
parties.”42 
On the basis of this sole article, the Committee of Ministers, 
assisted by the Department for the Execution of the European Court 
judgments,43 which is a department of the Council of Europe 
Secretariat, has drawn up an effective—although perfectible—system 
of implementation of the European Court’s judgments.  To have an 
idea of the scope of control of implementation by the Committee of 
Ministers, I suggest that you refer to the outline I prepared for this 
meeting.  I would prefer to share with you some of the means we have 
developed to improve the execution process in the challenging 
period we are facing now because, while there are more and more 
cases to supervise, the time we have to solve them is the same. 
Time, in the context of implementation of a European Court 
judgment, is a crucial parameter.  It is a crucial parameter when it 
comes to taking individual measures44 in favor of the applicant after 
the European Court found a violation of the Convention in its 
judgment.  Individual measures are taken in order to put the 
applicant as far as possible into the situation that he or she would 
have been in had the violation not occurred in an effort to achieve 
restitutio in integrum.  In some cases, these measures start with putting 
an end to the continuing violation of the Convention, and in some 
cases, they include trying to avoid time passing by.  In some cases, 
however, there is no possibility left to adopt any individual measures.  
I am thinking in particular of cases where the European Court found 
a procedural violation of Article 2, on right to life, or Article 3, 
prohibition of torture, and where the Committee of Ministers 
considered that there is a continuing obligation to conduct an 
                                                 
 41. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
art. 46(2), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 42. Id. art. 46(1). 
 43. For more information, see the website of the Department for the Execution 
of the Court’s Judgments, http://www.coe.int/T/E/Human_rights/execution/. 
 44.  For an overview of individual measures adopted by member states, see  
http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/execution/H-Exec(2006)2_IM_960e.doc. 
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effective investigation.  I am also thinking of cases concerning 
custody rights. 
Time is also an important parameter when it comes to general 
measures,45 the aim of which is for the European Court to avoid the 
repetition of that kind of violation.  This is first and foremost 
important for the individuals themselves.  But I also have to mention 
that now it is also important for the Convention system itself, as the 
system could collapse if the number of new applications keeps on 
increasing at the rate it has been increasing for years.  In this context, 
the Committee of Ministers adopted a resolution on judgments, 
leaving an underlying systemic problem.  The European Court is thus 
invited to identify in each judgment what it considers to be an 
underlying systemic problem, and to identify the source of this 
problem if possible.  These are what we now call the “pilot 
judgments.” 
Another requirement we have in mind in supervising execution is 
quality.  The judgment has to be implemented; not only the 
judgment itself, but the whole judgment.  This supposes that the 
reason the violation occurred is correctly identified and that 
pertinent measures are taken.  There is a fundamental principle in 
the Convention system—the principle of subsidarity.  It is enshrined 
in several articles of the Convention, and it has some consequences 
on the supervision of execution:  respondent states remain free to 
choose the means by which they will implement the European Court 
judgments.  The European Court, itself, has held in several 
judgments that “subject to monitoring by the Committee of 
Ministers, the respondent state remains free to choose the means by 
which it will discharge its legal obligation under Article 46 of the 
Convention, provided that such means are compatible with the 
conclusions set out in the European Court’s judgment.”46  
Nevertheless, the European Court tends to indicate in some 
judgments the type of measure that the respondent states might take, 
either when the nature of the violation found leaves no choice about 
the measure required to remedy it, or when the European Court 
found that a system situation or problem exists. 
Of course, it helps to have the European Court indicate or suggest 
the measures to be taken in the judgment itself.  But it does not 
prevent the Committee of Ministers from performing its supervisory 
role.  Furthermore, it should be noted that the domestic problems 
                                                 
 45.  For an overview of general measures adopted by member states, see 
http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/execution/H-Exec(2006)1_GM_960e.doc. 
 46. Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, 2000-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 249. 
  
206 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.  59:163 
underlying a violation are sometimes not obvious at the first 
examination, and they start to appear clearly only after long 
discussion with the authorities of the respondent state.  Sometimes, 
the execution of the judgments requires very complex measures.  
Perhaps the danger of expanding this method is that a respondent 
state may conclude that they have no measures to adopt because the 
European Court judgment does not indicate a measure in a specific 
case.  And, perhaps, this method is only really efficient for simple 
cases. 
As for now, with or without indication by the European Court, 
member states have undertaken an impressive number of reforms.  
Just one example:  it is almost obvious to every member state today 
that when the European Court finds a violation of the right to a fair 
trial in a criminal proceeding, the proceeding has to be reopened.  It 
is almost obvious to date, but it was not at all obvious eight or ten 
years ago.  This common understanding results from long discussions 
during the meetings of the Committee of Ministers, and also from 
the work of experts, who drafted recommendations to all member 
states on the reexamination or reopening of certain cases of domestic 
level following a judgment of the European Court.  Several member 
states have adopted legislation to allow for the reopening of 
proceedings.  For example, Belgium recently adopted a new law to 
this end on April 1, 2007.  France adopted such a law in 2000; this 
possibility also exists in Ukrainian law.  To me, this is clearly a success 
that can be attributed to the collective aspect of the execution of the 
European Court judgments. 
The collective aspect of the execution of the European Court 
judgments is fundamental in the European system; therefore, the 
selection of the twenty-five to thirty cases that can be discussed during 
a meeting of the Committee of Ministers out of the 6,000 cases 
pending before the Committee of Ministers is of great importance.  
There are four meetings a year specifically devoted to the supervision 
of execution, each extending over three days during which measures 
envisioned or adopted by respondent states are debated.  And there 
are real debates during the meetings of the Committee of Ministers.  
Delegations are more and more involved in cases against other 
countries, both to learn from their experiences, and, if necessary, to 
put pressure on their peers. 
In recent years, the Committee of Ministers modified its rules and 
its working methods in order to be more efficient and to be more 
transparent.  For example, although an applicant cannot take part in 
the Committee meetings, he or she can take part in the proceeding 
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by sending communications.  Non-governmental organizations, as 
well as national institutions for the promotion and protection of 
human rights, can also send communications to the Committee of 
Ministers.  Furthermore, since 2007, reports on all cases pending 
before the Committee are published online on the website of the 
Department for the Execution of the European Court judgments.  
The annotated agenda of the meetings of the Committee of Ministers 
and the decisions taken at the end of the meetings are also made 
public.  All of these measures contribute to a better execution of 
judgments. 
In 2004, the Committee of Ministers also adopted a package of 
recommendations to member states concerning mainly education 
and professional training on the Convention and the improvement of 
domestic remedies.  These recommendations draw practical 
consequences of the principle of subsidarities that I mentioned 
earlier.  Systematic publication of the European Courts’ judgments in 
the respondent states concerned and, in some cases, specific 
dissemination to judges or categories of civil servants affected by the 
judgment is required when the Committee deals with general 
measures.  As a result, the Convention and the case law of the 
European Court are directly applied at a domestic level.  It is hoped 
that publication of the European Courts’ judgments in all member 
states will enhance the direct effect of the Convention and, at the 
same time, start developing the erga omnes effect. 
In conclusion, I would like to come back to the starting point of my 
presentation.  It must appear awkward to entrust an executive body 
with supervising the implementation of decisions of a judicial body.  
But it works, and it works quite well.  All the recent measures taken 
regarding transparency of the work of the Committee of Ministers, 
and the aim of developing civil society participation, can be regarded 
as a guarantee of a full, if not a prompt implementation.  I wish I had 
the time to mention the cooperation with the other bodies of the 
Council of Europe, such as the Parliamentary Assembly or the 
Commissioner of Human Rights, which may play an important role in 
facilitating the execution of the European Court judgments.  We are 
in a continuous process of improving our proceedings, and I am 
therefore looking forward to hearing from your experience.  Thank 
you for your attention. 
G. Discussion 
Claudio Grossman:  Thank you very much.  I want to thank the 
speakers for presenting their views within the margins that we have 
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here.  It is difficult to be between the lunch and the comments that 
we have here, but I would like to give the opportunity for a couple of 
questions.  Are there questions or comments? 
****** 
Andrew Drzemczewski:  Since we are talking about advocacy before 
international human rights organs, please permit me three quick 
comments. 
My first point:  even if the case of your client has been declared 
inadmissible, say by the European Court or the Inter-American 
Commission, you may still have “won” the case.  How come?  Simply 
because your client—a person who was about to be deported—may in 
the meantime have been given the right to stay in the country for 
humanitarian purposes.  The application is declared inadmissible, so 
you lost the case, but in reality, your client got what he or she wanted!  
As far as he or she is concerned, the case was won. 
My second point:  legal advocacy can entail pursuing matters 
outside the classic structures of international human rights “legal” 
litigation.  Here I refer to, inter alia, political monitoring procedures, 
such as those carried out by the Monitoring Committee of the 
Parliamentary Assembly, and the so-called confidential “compliance 
with commitments” procedures setup by the Committee of Ministers, 
the executive organ of the Council of Europe. 
And last but not least:  the question of “compliance.”  Insofar as 
the supervision of Strasbourg Court judgments by the Committee of 
Ministers is concerned, I believe that the compliance rate is within 
the region of ninety-six to ninety-seven percent.  But such raw 
statistics must be taken with a pinch of salt, as, for example, it took 
Belgium eight years following the Strasbourg Court’s finding in the 
Marckx v. Belgium47 to bring its legal system fully into conformity with 
the requirements of the European Human Rights Convention. 
****** 
Audience:  We all know that reparations should include public 
apology, public acknowledgement of responsibility, etc.  Do you think 
that there is a conflict between that form of reparation and existing 
measures in different human rights systems in trying to save the face 
of the concerned nations?  For example:  by holding private or closed 
sessions, by not publishing reports in case of full compliance, or by 
                                                 
 47. 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 330 (1979). 
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any other ways that may help to save the face of nation.  Thank you 
very much. 
****** 
Audience:  Just two quick questions to the Inter-American Court and 
to the European Court representatives.  To the Inter-American 
Court, is there any consideration given to doing pilot judgments in 
the Inter-American system?  And to the European Court 
representative, it seems that both systems are like an elephant in a 
China shop—you have Russia, we have the United States.  There 
seems to be little will on the part of either super- or almost-
superpower to comply with our systems.  What is the thinking in the 
European system now as to what do with Russia? 
****** 
Audience:  In my country, they have not accomplished the public 
apology to the victims.  Maybe the moral sanction is harder than to 
say “I am sorry” to the victims or to publish in the newspaper the 
decision of the Inter-American Court. 
****** 
Audience:  I want to touch on something Ms. Abi-Mershed said 
earlier, that using these reparations and passing the cost on to the tax 
payers in these countries is a way to influence political will, but also 
we need to make sure that the information is passed onto them—that 
if the cost is passed on but the information is never disseminated to 
these people, that this what they are paying for.  I was just wondering 
if you could possibly touch upon how much information is passed on, 
how much is reported in the press, and what NGOs or other 
organizations can do to make sure that this information is known by 
people in these countries? 
****** 
Audience:  Thank you to my brother, the Commissioner from 
Tanzania.  I would like him to evaluate of the impact of the African 
Commission.  Does he think that the Commission, since its inception, 
has made a difference in the cause and process of opening up 
political space in Africa, democratization in the respects of human 
rights on the continent? 
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****** 
Claudio Grossman:  Would anyone care to comment on the 
questions asked, and if someone also wants to discuss what can be 
learned from each other? 
****** 
Sergio García Ramírez:  Just quickly, I believe that from what has 
been said, there are many things that we can learn.  Based upon my 
understanding of the characteristics of each system, it is not necessary 
to impose on each system the rules and regulations of the other, 
because each works within circumstances and conditions that are 
sometimes profoundly different.  We see what the achievements of 
each system are within the circumstances of each. 
Second, there was a question about “pilot” decisions.  Currently, in 
the Inter-American Court, there are no “pilot” decisions—or said 
another way, they are all “pilot” decisions.  There are relatively few 
decisions, and I would say that they are all relevant.  I would even 
dare to say that each one of them is another step toward a regime of 
reparations, and there is a certain track.  Whether this is a glass-half-
full or a glass-half-empty approach depends on who is looking at it.  I 
believe that the progress has been very great in the last ten years.  
Things have been achieved, not necessarily in the persecution of 
those responsible, but there have been achievements that before 
seemed impossible within the near future.  In a relatively short 
timeframe, there have been various achievements regarding 
reparations. 
Third, there was talk as well of the issue of public apologies and 
whether they are satisfactory for the victim.  The Inter-American 
Court always asks for public apologies and orders the publication of 
the relevant parts of the decision—the resolutions.  This is not done 
out of a concept of apology, but rather, this is done under the 
concept that the Court recognizes the responsibility of the state in 
the matter.  The issue of the imposition of apologies or the 
recognition by the state is another issue that the Court has dealt with.  
Now, let me say that I am cautious regarding the issue of public 
apologies because normally the one apologizing is not the 
government that was in power when the violations occurred.  And the 
person who seeks the apology is someone who does not have 
anything to do with the violations committed.  However, it is a 
symbolic gesture that contributes to the respect of human rights and 
will continue. 
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****** 
Elizabeth Abi-Mershed:  Three things.  The first point is that this 
opportunity today really shows what situation we are in, in the 
different regions and between the regions, and that is a situation of 
dialogue, evolution, and dynamism.  And the question of reparations 
and compliance is really a question of shared responsibility in looking 
for ways to advance, and we can learn so much from each other in 
this regard.  I want to mention something else about the patterns of 
compliance that we can see before the Inter-American Commission, 
and they are very obvious conclusions.  One is that there is higher 
compliance in simple situations, there is higher compliance in high 
profile cases.  There is higher compliance when civil society uses 
cases as part of a larger strategy at the national level.  And so when 
civil society creates resonance at the national level, you see a definite 
increase in the level and the quality of compliance.  There is higher 
compliance when friendly settlement is used as part of a larger state 
policy, and you can see patterns of friendly settlements coming in 
blocks when there is a convergence of state policy to engage with the 
Inter-American system.  So that ends up being quite effective. 
And the other point that I wanted to make is that the friendly 
settlement process poses a series of very legitimate legal questions for 
states, and they are legal questions that require a solution.  And one 
of the things that we are seeing in the system right now is that states 
are dialoguing with each other about how to solve some of these 
problems.  So we see things such as, in Argentina, the utilization of ad 
hoc tribunals to establish monetary compensation, which is so 
difficult to negotiate in some cases.  It is just so difficult for the 
government to arrive at from a unilateral position.  And the ad hoc 
tribunals have actually had a great deal of efficacy.  The other 
example I would mention is that in Colombia, in the administrative 
contentious jurisdiction, there has been an effort to incorporate the 
principles and the standard of criteria of the Inter-American system 
so that the judgments that come through that system are consistent 
with the Inter-American norms, and also so that there is a mechanism 
to comply with Inter-American Commission and Court decisions 
through the administrative contentious jurisdiction.  I will leave it 
there, thank you. 
****** 
Judge Ventura Robles:  Very briefly.  The comment of our colleague 
from the European Council was extremely interesting because it 
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precisely brought to light the importance of having a council of 
ministers monitoring compliance with the decisions.  This, I believe, 
is a fundamental problem in the Inter-American system because we 
lack this oversight.  After Elizabeth’s comments, it appears that the 
Inter-American Court and Commission are following the same path 
of participation and partial non-compliance of decisions and I believe 
that ministerial oversight is the only way to lead the way to a better 
system of monitoring which would result in ultimate compliance with 
decisions.  Thank you. 
****** 
Bahame Tom Mukirya Nyanduga:  I would like to respond to the 
comments regarding an evaluation of the impact of the African 
Commission in terms of democratization and opening space on the 
continents.  If I may say, first of all, with respect to the transition in 
the Commission over the first ten years and the second half of the 
twenty years of its existence, I think there has been a marked 
improvement in terms of the output of the work that is coming out of 
the Commission at different levels.  I think we have concentrated 
mostly on the decisions which have led to remedies when addressing 
the communication issues.  However, the Commission has also 
undertaken a considerable weight in terms of their reporting on 
certain key issues.  There is a very major report on issues of 
indigenous populations which has come out of the Commission, as 
well resolutions we each have addressed issues of governance on the 
continent.  And they have all been used for advocacy on human 
rights issues on the continent. 
On the issue of democratization, in November of 2005, the 
Commission adopted a number of resolutions addressing key 
democratization issues on the continent.  For example, after the 
elections in Ethiopia in May and June of 2005—and we know the 
outcome of those elections and the balance that ensued—the 
Commission adopted resolutions condemning the same.  There was 
an attack on the judiciary in Uganda, and the Commission adopted a 
resolution condemning the same.  So what I am saying is that, as 
much as we might not be able to measure the extent in terms of 
influencing the democratic space on the continent, the Commission 
has been able to highlight some of these issues. 
****** 
Charlotte de Broutelles:  I will try to reply to the difficult questions put 
to me regarding Russian cases.  I do not think we can speak of non-
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compliance actually.  Our problem is to have the judgment executed 
or implemented within a reasonable time, and there is no provision 
in the Convention to this end.  The only thing which is provided in 
the Council of Europe statute is that a member state may be 
suspended from its right of representation or may be requested to 
withdraw from the organization, or the Committee of Ministers may 
decide that a member state has ceased to be a member of the Council 
of Europe.  But this would not be a good reply to a delayed 
compliance.  Therefore, experts are thinking of other measures 
which could be taken in cases of delayed compliance. 
I would like to draw your attention to the huge amount of reform 
which has been undertaken in Turkey.  Ten years ago, people were 
asking the same question about Turkey that you are asking today 
about Russia.  Of course, there are still reforms to be undertaken in 
member states, but a lot has been done already.  Some cases have 
been on the Agenda of the Committee of Ministers for several years.  
But things are moving on, and they move on in every member state, 
therefore, in Russia, too. 
****** 
Claudio Grossman:  Allow me to thank the panelists for their 
important contributions. I believe they have enhanced our 
understanding on the overall situation affecting of the regional 
systems and their experiences on concrete matters, such as 
reparations.  We have also witnessed that supervisory organs have 
performed a creative function in this area.  In the Inter-American 
system, for example, the Court and Commission, within the 
parameters of the Convention, developed the content of reparations 
as well as the procedural role of petitioners.  They thus contributed, 
inter alia, to confront impunity by giving a voice to the victims 
themselves. 
III. WORKING LUNCH 
A. Paolo Carozza,48 Victor Abramovich & Felipe González 
Paolo Carozza:  I am very grateful to Dean Grossman for giving us 
the opportunity to be here at lunchtime.  As I think you know, the 
Inter-American Commission is in session today and in these weeks, 
and therefore it is difficult for us to be here for a length of time 
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throughout the day—as much as we would love to because all the 
themes being treated are of great importance and utility to us at the 
Commission.  But unfortunately, we also have to have our sessions 
and working meetings. 
So we envisioned having a very informal lunch with you where we 
could have a lot of open conversation and exchange about the 
themes that you have been dealing with and how they relate to the 
Commission’s work, as well as other things that may be of interest to 
you. 
I have to say that my own interest in participating in this 
conference and in this discussion has only been amplified in the last 
months because of meetings that I myself have had as President of 
the Inter-American Commission, both with representatives of the 
African system who came to visit us in Washington, and during visits 
that I have made to the institutions of the European system.  In both 
cases, I found the meetings extremely useful to open up horizons of 
discussion, analysis, and reflection about the strengths, weaknesses, 
problems, and convergences of the different systems.  And so I think 
the whole enterprise here is an extremely useful exercise. 
On the one hand, I am a great believer and advocate of the need 
for and the importance of regional systems in the global system of 
human rights precisely because I think they have proved to be as they 
were first intended; in many ways, they are able to be more effective, 
deeper, and more solid than the global system.  They are closer to the 
states and citizens they affect.  They are parts of communities of 
nations and peoples that often are bound by certain political or 
historical or legal and cultural/linguistic ties, and that helps to 
construct more solid systems.  So normatively, that is where there has 
often been greater development, and in terms of implementation 
and effectiveness, it is often where we see the highest degrees of 
compliance and integration of systems. 
But that whole structure, I believe, has its costs, too.  The cost is 
that the regional systems, when they operate on their own, carry with 
them, necessarily, the risk of a certain degree of insularity from one 
another.  Certain kinds of problems are intractable in that region, 
and it is difficult to see them from the outside and to imagine 
different kinds of solutions for them.  Certain of the vices of the 
system may not be apparent to us until we see them through the eyes 
of other systems and other experience. 
I think the comparison between the systems that we are doing 
today and that needs to be done more constantly is valuable as a way 
of generating dynamism, bringing consistency across the systems, and 
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helping to fashion norms and practices and processes that have some 
consistency but that arise from the bottom up, so that they can also 
be more effective.  But I think it is also important to realize that the 
comparison and confrontation between the systems does not 
necessarily need to be with the aim of bringing them closer together 
or making them more alike.  In some cases, it might be useful to have 
the comparison precisely in order to delineate and justify what would 
be the proper differences between them; the way the different 
systems address different kinds of needs in their regions and different 
kinds of dynamics among varying peoples and states.  Being able to 
make us more critically aware of the way in which our jurisprudence 
or our procedural practices and so forth do justifiably differ from 
European ones or African ones is good; it makes us more aware and 
more conscious of the peculiarities and strengths as well as the 
weaknesses of our practices. 
I think the kinds of issues on which that kind of comparison is 
really fruitful are very evident in the conversation today.  Diane and 
the other organizers have identified three areas in which it is very 
evident that the comparison and confrontation between the systems 
can lead to a lot of self-reflection about ways to improve and ways in 
which the different dynamics lend to different results and different 
kinds of solutions.  I will not say more about those, because you are 
having such a rich discussion, unless people have specific questions 
for us.  But I thought that my colleagues, Victor Abramovich and 
Felipe González, and I might reflect a little bit, and provoke further 
conversation on some of the other areas in which comparison, 
exchange, dialogue, and confrontation could be useful to expand the 
discussion. 
One of the areas that seems most evident to me has to do simply 
with the structural aspects of advocacy in the systems.  One of the 
principal problems and challenges of advocacy before the systems, at 
least in the Inter-American and European systems, is that there is a 
great tension going on right now that I imagine was quite evident in 
the conversation this morning and will be this afternoon:  the tension 
between the demands of a system that seeks to do justice and provide 
redress in every single individual case—and that therefore generates 
the kinds of administrative problems that we have been dealing with 
on an increasing basis—and a system that instead seeks to supervise 
and promote human rights through more large-scale, structural, pilot 
cases, certiorari type of review, impact litigation, and those kinds of 
advocacy efforts that seek to solve large-scale or structural or systemic 
problems through certain individual cases.  How this tension is 
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resolved leads to differences in basic rules of procedure, in how 
opinions and decisions are made and drafted, what kind of 
implementation is necessary, and administrative questions about how 
to handle backlogs of cases, and the standing of petitioners and so 
forth.  So, that it is a major area that needs to be dealt with. 
But I would also like to stress that I think it is really critical that the 
comparison between the systems not be limited to procedural, 
institutional, and structural questions; that comparisons really go to 
the normative, substantive content of different human rights 
problems and areas and thus help us understand, as deeply as 
possible, what the proper reach and content of the norms should 
be—for example, freedom of expression, the protection of 
minorities—whether indigenous groups or religious minorities—or 
the standards for assessing the independence of tribunals and 
procedural protections like due process and delay.  Those kinds of 
substantive applications of human rights norms are just a few 
examples of ones with which our system has struggled, and is 
struggling, or ones in which we have already developed some kind of 
norms and processes.  By that kind of exchange, I think the 
deepening of the substantive understanding of the content of human 
rights is really essential as well. 
Again, I want to leave time primarily for question-and-answer and 
discussion, so I will stop there and let Victor and Felipe add some of 
the thoughts that they might have and, otherwise, simply take 
questions and open it up to conversation. 
****** 
Victor Abramovich:  Simply, I would like to give my thanks to Dean 
Grossman and the Washington College of Law for the invitation to be 
here today.  Due to time and because many issues have been raised in 
previous panel discussions this morning, I know it would be 
interesting to open the floor for discussion.  That being said, I think 
Paolo’s opening is sufficient and we should go straight to questions. 
****** 
Paolo Carozza:  Yes, I should have noted early on, in fact, that 
although Victor and I can stay, as scheduled, until 2:30 p.m., precisely 
because of the demands of our working meetings and so forth at the 
Inter-American Commission, that Felipe, who has been here all 
morning with you, is going to have to leave in just ten minutes. 
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B. Discussion 
Bahame Tom Mukirya Nyanduga:  I am a member of the African 
Commission which has followed closely the working relationship 
between the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American 
courts.  I have a colleague, a judge of the African Court, who is also 
attending.  I think he will be one of the panelists this afternoon.  
Currently, both the African Commission and the Court are in the 
process of harmonizing our rules of procedure.  We know the systems 
are slightly different and this is the point I wanted to make; 
particularly, when you mentioned the importance of looking at not 
only the institutional relationship but also to try to see what we learn 
in terms of the principles which are evolving in the two systems. 
Here, I can say that from the African Commission perspective, and 
as was mentioned earlier, our Charter provides for a possibility of 
being inspired by the principles and instruments which have been 
adopted universally all throughout the system.  We always look to the 
Inter-American system to see the kind of principles or the kind of 
mechanisms that are being developed.  And of the number of issues 
which came up during the panel discussions this morning, the issue 
of follow-up on implementation of recommendations is particularly 
important in terms of understanding how the Inter-American system 
has developed and how it is evolving to ensure that those 
recommendations are implemented. 
The point I want to raise or even to reiterate on what you have said 
is the need for the two systems, notwithstanding the differences in 
culture and background, to continue the exchange so that we are 
able to see how we can work closely together and also to develop the 
principles because, as we all know, we are interdependent and the 
principles are universal. 
****** 
Paolo Carozza:  One of the things that struck me about that 
comment is that the two particular areas that you have raised—the 
question of institutional relations between the Inter-American Court 
and the Commission and the procedures that flow from that, and the 
question of how we follow up on recommendations or decisions, are 
both very good examples of areas in which there is not a fixed 
problem that is static in time.  The way that the challenge has arisen 
for us, I think, is precisely out of the fact that there is a dynamic 
relationship between the institutions, for example, and it is very 
different today than it was before the reforms of 2001 or when the 
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Court was first established and the Commission first began to send 
some of the cases to the Court.  The existence of different kinds of 
advocacy groups within civil society has changed the relationship.  
The past rules of the Court that give greater access, direct access, to 
the Court by the representatives of the victims has also changed that 
relationship.  The Commission’s own practices regarding when and 
how and under what circumstances to send cases to the Court has 
changed that relationship as well. 
It is exactly out of the dynamism—the fact that it is changing all the 
time—that we need to be constantly reevaluating it.  That is why we 
are engaged now with the members of the Inter-American Court in 
an ongoing discussion about what the next stage of changes demands 
and how we need to adapt again. 
The same is true of questions of follow-up, and this is why it is 
critical to be asking these questions across systems, because the kind 
of follow-up that was necessary in the European system before the 
great expansion to forty-seven states of the Council of Europe was 
very different than it is today.  The same is true, in a certain sense, in 
the opposite direction with respect to the Inter-American institutions 
where follow-up has a slightly different character and dynamic when 
we are talking about doing so with respect to governments that, in 
differing degrees, are democratically accountable as opposed to ones 
that are simply criminal dictatorships.  And so we need to learn from 
you as well as you from us precisely because things are fluid all the 
time. 
****** 
Felipe González:  There is a point I would like to raise that was 
discussed at the prior panel, that it is important to consider the issue 
of legal aid for victims.  In fact, until a few years ago, the victims did 
not have autonomy to litigate a case before the Inter-American Court, 
so the representatives acted as advisors to the Inter-American 
Commission.  So it was the Commission which was financing the 
litigation before the Court.  Then the victims became autonomous to 
litigate the cases.  They cannot lodge a case but can act autonomously 
once the cases have been lodged at the Court and, since then, there 
has been this whole debate about establishing some system of legal 
aid or a trust fund that would allow all victims to be adequately 
represented at the litigation at the Court.  And I think that it would 
be important to learn about the ways that the other systems are 
dealing with this and we have for years been trying to move forward 
with this without much success. 
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****** 
Victor Abramovich:  I just want to add that I think the question about 
the relationship between the Inter-American Commission and the 
Court and how it works is an important question.  I remember that 
ten years ago, there was debate within the Inter-American system 
about moving towards the European system—a judicialization of the 
system.  In other words, to leave the Court as the only protective 
body.  I think the recognition in this debate of the role of the Inter-
American Commission as a monitoring body above and beyond its 
management of the cases, was important.  It is important to the 
system to have a judicial body accompanied by a quasi-judicial body 
that can monitor the cases and at the same time oversee the situation 
of human rights within the countries.  The Commission is able to act 
as a line of communication between the disputes and the structural 
situation on the ground in the countries. 
I think it is important to link the Inter-American system with the 
African system in particular.  At the time this discussion occurred at 
the end of the 1990s there was a certain expectation about the 
process of the transition to democracy in Latin America.  There was 
an expectation that democracy would alter the human rights 
problems in the region.  And I believe that there have been some very 
important improvements in the region in terms of respect for human 
rights, improvements in electoral systems, improvements in the 
justice system, etc.  However, the end of the democratic transition did 
not bring with it stronger democracies, meaning that there continued 
to be violations of human rights and structural problems which led to 
violations of human rights.  I believe that the function of the Inter-
American Commission to articulate its work with disputes to the 
Court, as well as its monitoring work, continues to be key.  I believe 
that there are certain similarities with the functions carried out by the 
African Commission. 
What we are seeing in this process is a much greater role being 
played by the victims.  As Felipe González said, the Inter-American 
Commission continues to carry out its work as before, while at the 
same time adjusting to a greater participation of victims in the cases 
before the Inter-American Court.  But I do believe that it is important 
to show this relationship between the disputes and the monitoring 
work, and there are many examples of this.  For example, with regard 
to amnesty laws and countries going through the process of judicial 
transitions, it is clear how the individual disputes and subsequent 
jurisprudence created a foundation for the Commission’s monitoring 
work.  The disputes and the monitoring role of the Commission are 
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intimately interconnected and the Commission carries out the 
function of being the link between the two.  I believe that is an 
important historical precedent to the discussion we are having here 
today. 
****** 
Claudio Grossman:  I was a member of the Inter-American 
Commission from 1994 to 2003.  In my view, there are three historical 
moments for the Inter-American system.  The first was the fight 
against dictators.  The most important technique that the supervisory 
system used in this period was not the individual petition or the case 
system.  When there are more than 20,000 disappeared persons in 
Argentina, you cannot open an individual file for each and go 
through all the procedures of submission, hearings, and so forth.  
The sheer numbers make this task extremely difficult.  In addition, a 
case does not pre-judge its result.  At that time, it was very important 
to expose disappearances and other mass and gross violations of 
human rights immediately, issuing country reports that would 
authoritatively describe those international crimes.  Accordingly, the 
Commission attempted to visit countries and, whether it was allowed 
or not, issue reports that became very important for the purposes of 
delegitimizing dictatorships. 
The second historical moment was marked by the legacy of 
dictatorship, which included dealing with amnesty laws and freedom 
of expression restrictions.  During this period, the supervisory organs 
resorted to a combination of means, utilizing country or situation 
reports together with individual petitions.  For the most part, 
member states with elected governments made this possible because 
they started to cooperate with the system by participating in the 
different proceedings. 
I remember when I was the President of the Inter-American 
Commission in 1995, I reported that we had adopted—and were very 
proud of—nine decisions.  In 2001, there were over fifty decisions 
issued.  This shows important growth in handling petitions, bringing 
about a transition from country reports to petitions, which became 
the most important supervisory technique employed by the system. 
The third historical moment was brought about by the need to 
achieve social inclusion in the face of vulnerable groups in the region 
such as indigenous populations, women, children, refugees, and the 
poor.  The existence of severe inequalities and deprivation constitute 
a threat to democracy and open possibilities for demagogic reactions 
that ultimately go against the human rights tradition.  At this stage, 
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the case system was supplemented by the expansion of 
rapporteurships focusing on matters such as indigenous groups, 
women, migrant workers, etc. 
 It is worth noting that these historical moments are not entirely 
separated and, depending on the country, we see how components of 
these moments overlap and we see the role that organ can play in 
establishing priorities required to promote and defend human rights 
in a given context.  Taking into account the creative, committed, 
and—allow me to say—unavoidable role that the organs play, I 
believe that it would be desirable to increase the interaction between 
the different systems so that they can learn from each other in 
matters of jurisprudence as well as in the development of techniques 
designed to enhance their contribution in a dynamic reality. 
****** 
Paolo Carozza:  Yes, that would be extremely helpful and, as one 
indication of it, I think we have been benefited at the Inter-American 
Commission and I like to think that my colleagues from the Inter-
American Court have been benefited at the Court by exactly that 
exchange between Commission and Court. 
And we have, in the secretariats of both, individuals who have 
transferred from one of the institutions to the other and provide 
invaluable experience as a result of that.  You can only augment by 
doing it across systems as well. 
The only thing I wanted to come back to, without taking time from 
whatever other questions there might be, is that I think Dean 
Grossman’s tripartite analysis of the history is extremely useful and 
important.  I want to mention, arising out of that, the thought that 
there may be a fourth period that is beginning now that has a lot to 
do with what Victor was pointing out about the increasing awareness 
of the structural and endemic weaknesses of the democracies in the 
system.  Even those countries that now have had democracies for a 
period of time in the Americas are increasingly being faced with the 
kinds of large-scale and intractable human rights problems that arise 
out of widespread social exclusion in the region.  And so, it can come 
up in anything from systematic discrimination of certain segments of 
the population to prison conditions, where you cannot just take one 
case, two cases, two individuals and say, “Now we are going to solve 
the entire problem of conditions of detention in the country.” 
I think we are struggling with the need to adapt, once again, to a 
new stage where we are combining some of the elements of the 
previous stages and fashioning new hybrids, and it is very much an 
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open struggle, I think, among us as to how we are going to do that 
and we really need help. 
****** 
Andrew Drzemczewski:  On the cross-pollination point.  Yes, indeed 
this should be pursued more often, as we can learn a lot from one 
another.  I understand that, not so long ago, a senior staff member of 
the Inter-American Commission’s secretariat spent a number of 
months working in the registry of the European Court in Strasbourg.  
I do not think there exist any intractable difficulties in 
accommodating staff members in the respective institutions. 
 There is also, as you pointed out earlier, Paolo, the utility of 
organizing regular formal or less formal meetings between courts.  
Members of the European Court of Justice (the EU court based in 
Luxembourg) regularly  hold meetings with judges from the Court in 
Strasbourg, and the President of the Strasbourg Court, Jean-Paul 
Costa, has recently had meetings with representatives from the Inter-
American Commission, as well as the President of the International 
Court of Justice, Rosalyn Higgins. 
And please let me add a comment while we are on the topic of 
learning from each other.  With respect to this, we in Europe were in 
a comfortable situation—in so far as the regional human rights 
mechanism was concerned in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s.  The basic 
premise of the ECHR was that we are all mature democracies with 
human rights and when there are difficulties, the fine-tuning of legal 
norms with respect to, for example, the freedom of expression, would 
be carried out in Strasbourg.  Rarely would issues of fact be disputed 
in Strasbourg.  But the situation has drastically changed with the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, and the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and 
the ex-Soviet Union.  We now have, in the Council of Europe, major 
human rights violations to deal with.  Take, for example, the case law 
before the European Court with respect to Chechnya.  Problems 
encountered are akin to those which confronted the Inter-American 
Commission and Court in the 1970s and 1980s.  You have a rich 
experience of knowing how best to handle major human rights 
violations, a case law from which we in Europe can learn.  Was it not, 
for example, the experience of the Inter-American human rights 
bodies which inspired the Strasbourg Court to develop its important 
case law on substantive and procedural violations of non-derogable 
human rights?  I am sure that we, in the so-called mature 
democracies of Western Europe and, in particular, the  human rights 
  
2009] ADVOCACY BEFORE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES 223 
monitoring bodies based in Strasbourg, still have a lot to learn from 
you. 
My next point is about the parliamentary dimension of the work of 
the organization I work for.  This is a unique feature of the Council 
of Europe which, since its creation in 1949 has, as one of its statutory 
bodies, the Parliamentary Assembly composed of parliamentarians 
who have two hats:  one, as parliamentarians who work in their own, 
national parliament; and another one, as parliamentarians in our 
Parliamentary Assembly.  This Assembly of parliamentarians can play 
a significant role in the human rights field.  I will just give you one 
example. 
My chairperson of the Legal Affairs and Human Rights Committee 
is Mrs. Däubler-Gmelin.  That name may not mean much to you, 
unless you are conversant in German political life.  But the position 
she holds, and the potential influence she has in her country, can be 
considerable.  This is a person who was Minister of Justice of 
Germany for over four years, and is also a professor of law,  presently 
the president of the Bundestag’s Human Rights Committee in 
Germany—not a small country.  She, and persons like her, have 
several former ministers of justice and interior in the Legal Affairs 
Committee composed of eighty-four members that can have an 
important say on the domestic political scene, and not least in the 
manner in which human rights issues are dealt with in their 
respective national legislatures.  The parliamentary dimension is 
missing in most, if not all of other regional human rights 
mechanisms.  One should not forget that state responsibility for 
human rights violations is not the sole responsibility of a government, 
the executive, coupled with that of actions taken by the 
administration and the state apparatus, including the judicial branch.  
There is also an important dimension of responsibility, often 
overlooked by human rights activists, which has to be shouldered by 
the state’s legislative organs.  Just look at the influence that the 
report on extraordinary rendition and secret CIA prisons in Europe 
has had in the world—hitting the front pages of many newspapers—
which was prepared by Swiss Senator Dick Marty, the predecessor of 
Mrs. Däubler-Gmelin as chair of the Legal Affairs and Human Rights 
Committee.49 
                                                 
 49. For more information regarding the work of the Committee on Legal Affairs 
and Human Rights, see the Committee’s website at http://assembly.coe.int/ 
Main.asp?link=/Committee/JUR/role_E.htm.  The website describes, for example, 
the work undertaken by the Committee on the subject of respect for human rights in 
the fight against terrorism.  In the new international climate that has emerged since 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Committee has been at the forefront 
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A final point.  In the Committee of Ministers, which supervises the 
execution of Strasbourg Court judgments, as explained by my 
colleague Charlotte de Broutelles, if a case is blocked for more than 
five years or if there is a major structural problem, our Parliamentary 
Assembly’s Legal Affairs Committee—with the dual hat of 
parliamentarians working in Strasbourg and in their own 
parliaments—decided about seven or eight years ago—ex officio—to 
seize itself of such cases and to help in the implementation process. 
****** 
Victor Abramovich:  I am not in any position to analyze the European 
system, but it seems important to return to what Dean Grossman was 
saying about different forms of judicialization and the process of 
judicialization.  If one looks at the decisions of the Inter-American 
Court, even the very first decisions, I believe it has historically been a 
tribunal that always made decisions and looked beyond the specific 
case.  And in the decisions, there are distinct ways to have an impact 
regarding structural changes, such as in the cases of massive and 
systemic violations.  For example, the issue of measures calling for 
institutional reparation that requires changes of regulations or 
policies that go beyond the situation of reparations for the individual 
in the case.  There are many examples of this, such as the case The 
Last Temptation of Christ v. Chile,50  where Chile was required to revise 
its constitution to establish the prevention of prior censorship.  
Beyond the individual case the reparations have a collective effect 
and scope.  Another way of saying it is, and the decision was very 
strong, is the impact the decision has on the jurisprudence of 
domestic courts.  This impact is very clear, for example, regarding the 
freedom of expression, procedural guarantees, amnesty laws, etc.  
The Barrios Altos case had a direct impact, for example, on the 
decisions regarding amnesty laws issued by the Argentina Supreme 
Court.  Another example of the collective impact that a decision in a 
discrete case can have is the discussion regarding peace and justice in 
Colombia. 
Lately, I believe, as Paolo noted as well, there is a tendency in the 
system to make progress regarding the treatment of collective cases 
that have many victims.  At times, there are many victims named on 
the case and sometimes the victims are the communities, as in the 
                                                                                                                 
of the Assembly’s condemnation of all forms of terrorism.  In its reports, the 
Committee has insisted that terrorism can and must be combated effectively by 
means that fully respect human rights and the rule of law. 
 50. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73 (Feb. 5, 2001). 
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cases of indigenous communities.  I believe that it is important 
because, beyond the role of the Inter-American Court as a tribunal, 
the impact of the decisions go beyond the case and function also as 
pressure in a way for the states to revise their regulations, practices, 
and policies.  And I believe this is important. 
Now, the other question that I think is important to put into the 
discussion is the issue of the 2001 reform.  Was it a greater 
judicialization or not?  This is what I believe is part of the debate.  
Without a doubt, the number of cases that the Inter-American 
Commission began to send to the Inter-American Court as of 2001 is 
greater.  Before, between 1997 and 2001, there was an average of four 
cases per year sent to the Court.  From 2001 to 2007, there was an 
average of twelve cases sent to the Court per year.  One looks at those 
numbers and could think that there is an increase in the quantity of 
cases that are sent to the Court and a tendency for greater 
judicialization of the cases.  However, if one looks at the relationship 
between the quantity of the cases that go to the Court and the 
quantity of the petitions received by the Commission, the spread 
remains the same.  Between 1997 and 2001, one percent of the cases 
were sent to the Court.  The quantity of the petitions received by the 
Commission during that timeframe were 450 to 500 petitions per year 
and four of those per year were sent to the Court.  That is less than 
one percent.  Between 2001 and 2007, the Commission received 
around 1,200 petitions per year, and twelve of those were sent to the 
Court on average per year.  That is to say that even after the 2001 
reforms, the percentage of the cases that were sent to the Court is 
one percent of the cases that the system processes—which is to say 
that I do not believe that there has been a movement towards the 
judicialization of the system. 
However, I do believe that it is very important for the Inter-
American Court, by way of collective reparations or collective cases, 
to focus on the structural situation within the country aside from the 
individual case.  I believe that the function of the Court goes beyond 
the victims of the individual cases.  This would have a very significant 
impact on the structural problems that we are seeing in the region at 
this time. 
****** 
Paolo Carozza:  Both of the themes that Andrew raises I think are 
really helpful points of comparison.  When I came to the Inter-
American Commission, I came as a professor, as a scholar, not as 
primarily an advocate or activist, although I had done some litigation 
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in the Inter-American system.  I was a teacher and my area of specialty 
was much more the European system than the Inter-American system, 
and most of my scholarly work has been on Europe not on the 
Americas.  And so when I came to the Inter-American system, as a 
Commissioner, I came, really, in a certain implicit way with the 
mental model of Europe dominant in my mind.  My way of perceiving 
the possible direction of the Inter-American system was by reference 
to the European one, including Protocol 11 and the elimination of 
the European Commission, which I had never really questioned until 
that point as being the natural evolution of the way that regional 
systems would move.  And it was only after having experienced, in a 
serious way, for a period of time, the additional non-judicial roles of 
the Commission that I realized exactly what was now missing in the 
European system. 
So I think it is a decision that has had consequences today that I do 
not imagine you, who are involved intimately in it, did not foresee in 
the mid-1990s.  And it has principally to do with the need to 
accompany the judicial and legalistic protection of human rights with 
other mechanisms that are primarily focused on politics, on 
promotion, on what I think of, in the broadest sense, as pedagogical 
approaches to human rights; the kinds of engagements with political 
and legal and social actors that help to increase a knowledge and 
acceptance and internalization of the norms and so forth.  I think 
that is critically missing now in the European countries.  It is being 
done by some institutions but there is not a center of gravity for those 
things the way that there is in the Inter-American system. 
That realization, I think, has certain implications for our own 
system too.  Because of the dual nature of the Inter-American 
Commission, this quasi-judicial one that treats individual cases, and 
also the more political and pedagogical and sort of larger role that it 
plays through the other kind of supervisory tools, there is always a 
question of how to maintain the proper balance between those two 
things, especially in light of the fact that we are chronically and 
critically short of resources.  The fact that we are so short of resources 
within the Inter-American system means that every decision to 
allocate a certain number of resources towards the processing of 
cases or away from the processing of cases and towards preparation of 
other reports means, really, that you are sort of critically depriving 
the other kinds of exercises from the same sorts of resources. 
So right now we are facing a massive backlog of cases and a huge 
delay, and it creates all sorts of problems:  problems of equity, 
problems of political relations, and so forth.  And so there is a 
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massive amount of pressure and incentive to devote more and more 
resources towards the processing of cases, the elimination of the 
backlog and so forth.  And the experience of Europe should be sort 
of a warning to us that if we proceed in that direction without 
sufficient attention to maintaining the strength of the other kinds of 
tools that we have and that we need to maintain, the Inter-American 
system could find itself in a serious imbalance as well over time. 
****** 
Claudio Grossman:  I do not think that simply the proportion of 
cases being referred to a court tells the story. 
****** 
Victor Abramovich:  No, you are right.  It is a little like what Paolo was 
saying.  Beyond the actual number of cases that are sent to the Inter-
American Court, the time the Inter-American Commission spends 
working is very much concentrated in the dispute aspect of the cases.  
Even as such, however, you can see in the last few years a series of 
reports monitoring structural situations in the countries.  I believe 
that the key issue is how to coordinate the judicial work of the 
Commission with the monitoring role of the Commission.  I believe 
that this is the main point.  And a possible initial conclusion is that 
the cases, and the quantity of cases that the Commission receives, act 
as a sounding board for the problems in the region.  It is not the only 
diagnostic monitoring method, but it works as a sounding board for 
these problems.  And without a doubt, one of the main issues that 
appears in all of the cases is the deficiency of the administration of 
justice systems on the national level.  If one looks back at the 
Commission’s reports regarding the issue of access to justice, it is 
clearly a central theme in the monitoring work of the Commission. 
I believe that therein lies the strategic aspect of the work of the 
system.  How do we ensure that the jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Court and the human rights treaties are implemented at 
the domestic level?  At the internal level?  How do we achieve 
coordination and dialogue between the international system and 
national judicial systems at the same time?  I believe that the Court is 
doing a great job with the higher courts of the countries in the 
region.  There are good improvements in several countries in the 
region regarding the domestic application of international laws.  Not 
only regarding issues of amnesty laws, but in other respects as well.  I 
believe that this is a strategic aspect of the work of the system.  
Figuring out how to strengthen the protection at the national level 
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and the role of the national tribunals is key.  This is why if one were 
to look back into history, one would say that this is the central axis of 
the monitoring work of the Inter-American Commission, which has 
everything to do with the access to justice and the administration of 
justice.  In my opinion this is the underlying issue when you look at 
the docket of cases and the majority of the states request an 
exception due to insufficient domestic resources.  The problem is not 
a lack of resources, but rather the infectiveness of the judicial systems.  
International protection will come with greater domestic guidance. 
****** 
Paolo Carozza:  Just to pick up on the second part of Andrew’s 
comment in relation to what was said about the treaties—although I 
think it is a great achievement that the treaty has succeeded in not 
being treated like a constitution within the tradition of this 
hemisphere, one of the costs, of course, is that it means that you do 
have to find other mechanisms of adaptation of the system to the 
needs.  And the fact that we have a system that, unlike the European 
system, does not have a strong political supervisory mechanism and 
set of institutions and integration of regional parliaments with 
national politicians and so forth is one of the things that we are 
critically lacking.  And so, in the absence of a protocol that would add 
it but also carry the risk of opening up everything else, I think one of 
the challenges that we face is figuring out what might be functional 
equivalents, functional parallels to what exists in Europe that could 
be developed without refashioning the whole structure of the 
American convention and the institutions. 
 
So now I am going to leave and let you struggle with these 
questions all afternoon with one another because we do have to get 
back to our sessions.  But maybe, just by way of closing, I will say this:  
I think it is worth reminding ourselves, periodically, that what all of 
this enterprise is about, that we are all committed to, that we are all 
here because we are interested in it and engaged in it is, at the end of 
the day, the value—the inestimable value—of every human person.  
That is what the whole premise of the human rights enterprise is.  
And if it is not about that, then the whole thing collapses like a house 
of cards at the end of the day.  It just becomes one political 
ideological project to be opposed by another one.  So that does not 
necessarily mean that the international system does have to proceed 
through taking every single individual case and exploring it to its 
end.  Maybe it does but not necessarily.  But I think we have to realize 
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that the attraction of the individual cases in large part stems from 
that, from this idea and this fundamental principle and desire to do 
right by the person, every person; that one person’s injustice is 
already too much. 
****** 
Victor Abramovich:  As has been raised here in this discussion, there 
is a change regarding the issues—from massive violations to structural 
problems that are related to violations of human rights.  And I think 
that therein lies the challenge that still exists for the system—how to 
work with structural cases.  I believe that there are improvements in 
terms of thinking about collective reparations that go beyond the 
case.  I believe that there is an improvement in processing cases that 
affect groups.  Many times, states complain about the processing of 
cases implicating groups of people, but these cases allow the system to 
tackle structural problems—for example, cases regarding prisons or 
indigenous communities.  And I believe that another key issue 
regarding structural issues of human rights violations is maintaining 
the monitoring role of the Inter-American Commission such as the 
visits it conducts, the coordination between monitoring, and the 
actual cases themselves.  I believe that this is an essential issue 
because we leave the massive violations behind, but there continue to 
be structural problems that affect the validity of human rights.  Above 
all, it affects groups or entire sectors of the population.  Thank you. 
IV. PANEL 3:  INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES FACING REGIONAL 
SYSTEMS FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
A. Diego Rodríguez-Pinzón 51 
We will begin now with the final panel here at the Washington 
College of Law.  We are delighted to have here a very interesting panel 
to discuss mainly what we have envisioned as the challenges of the 
regional systems.  You have heard a lot of information discussed in 
the previous panels that I think is going to serve also as a basis for 
some of the discussions that we are going to be holding in this panel. 
So without saying anything else, I will present the first panelist, 
Pablo Saavedra.  Pablo Saavedra is the Secretary of the Inter-
American Court in San Jose, Costa Rica.  More importantly, from my 
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perspective, he is a very good friend of our institution and a very 
good friend of the human rights cause.  He has been a very creative 
force on the Inter-American Court, fostering many of the latest 
improvements in that tribunal with the support of very dynamic 
judges.  He will present some of the challenges the Court has been 
facing, and hopefully at the end, we will have enough time for 
questions for him and his colleagues. 
B. Pablo Saavedra52 
Thank you, Diego.  First, I want to thank the Washington College of 
Law and the MacArthur Foundation for the invitation.  I think that 
one of the challenges that we have for the future is that of achieving a 
dialogue about the problems and the strengths of the three most 
permanent regional systems for the protection of human rights.  
From the perspective of the Inter-American Court, I want to point 
out certain strengths and, on the other hand, certain problems that 
exist.  I first want to highlight the system of reparations of the Court.  
I believe that one of the greatest contributions that the Court has 
made to the case system is within the sphere of reparations.  In each 
specific case, the Court orders individual reparations, but also takes a 
broad view by ordering structural reparations in order to address 
underlying problems so that particular kinds of violations will not 
reoccur.  Accordingly, it is important that we ask whether the Court’s 
judgments are being complied with, and that we address the 
challenges that it is facing. 
Specifically, regarding indemnifications, at the beginning of this 
year we presented data that showed that eighty-one percent of 
damage awards ordered by the Inter-American Court were paid by 
the states, and some states are currently in the process of paying.  I 
believe that this figure reflects positively on the level of 
implementation of the orders of the Court in that respect.  The states 
also comply with implementing reparations ordered by the Court in 
which positive obligations are imposed, such as the construction of 
monuments, the naming of streets, etc.  Compliance has been 
somewhat delayed, as can be seen from the Court’s supervisory data, 
but the completion of these projects as guarantees of non-repetition 
and measures of satisfaction is important.  It should be noted that 
when the Court has ordered public apologies or acts of public 
reconciliation in a particular case, generally the act is officiated by 
                                                 
 52. Registrar, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Organization of American 
States.  The views expressed are those of the speaker and do not necessarily reflect 
those of the Commission or the OAS. 
  
2009] ADVOCACY BEFORE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES 231 
high-level authorities of the State in question.  We have seen some 
very significant examples of this, such as the public apology of the 
President or Vice President of Guatemala. 
I believe that the Court has made great advances and contributions 
in ordering reparations that address structural problems with the aim 
of avoiding future violations of the Convention.  I would like to 
briefly refer to some examples.  One of them was mentioned this 
morning:  limitations on amnesty.  Developments in the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court on this matter have been 
influential.  Since the case of Barrios Altos,53 amnesty laws have been 
left without legal effect in that state.  And this is not only in Peru.  
The outcome of this case has served as a guide to the Argentine 
Supreme Court and to the high courts of other states in the region. 
Another example can be found in the case of The Last Temptation of 
Christ v. Chile,54 in which the Court ordered the state to reform its 
political constitution to remove censorship of cinematography, and 
the state complied.55  Through cases like this, the Court has 
prevented similar cases from arising.  Similarly, a law was recently 
passed in Chile in compliance with another judgment of the Court 
regarding access to public information.56 The President of Chile 
asked legislators to pass a law that was in accord with international 
standards in order to comply with the Court’s orders, since previously 
no such law existed in Chile.57 
We also have many examples of cases involving indigenous 
communities.  For instance, a case arrived at the Inter-American 
Court due to a structural problem in Nicaragua, specifically, that 
there was no law that permitted the demarcation of the ancestral 
territories of an indigenous community.58  The Court ordered, as a 
measure of reparation, the enactment of a law setting forth specific 
guidelines for this purpose, and this has allowed the implementation 
of various processes of demarcation in Nicaragua.59  Additionally, 
there is a case against Costa Rica concerning freedom of expression 
and the right to appeal a judgment to a higher court.  Under Costa 
Rican law, the only remedy available to challenge a criminal 
conviction was the writ of cassation, and this remedy only allowed a 
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limited review of the proceedings of courts of first instance.60  Thus, 
the Inter-American Court ordered the government to adapt the laws 
of Costa Rica to the standards of the American Convention on 
Human Rights (American Convention).61  Costa Rica has since passed 
a new law intended to bring its domestic legislation in line with 
international standards. 
There are many other examples where the Court’s jurisprudence 
has had a great impact.  For instance, the Court has had an impact on 
the functioning of military tribunals, attempting to restrict the scope 
of their jurisdiction so that it may be exercised only over members of 
a state’s military for offenses that affect the military’s legal interests.62  
Here, I believe that we encounter the greatest challenge that the 
Inter-American system faces:  achieving a “jurisprudential dialogue” 
between national and international tribunals.  It is important, in 
particular, that national tribunals engage in this dialogue and ensure 
“conventionality” (convencionalidad) in their decisions.  In other 
words, when national courts are applying the law in a particular case, 
they should not do so only from the perspective of domestic law, but 
should also take into account the international treaties that their own 
States have ratified.  This, I believe, is one of the most interesting 
processes taking place in Latin America in the last decade.  We are 
seeing very positive results, such as the incorporation of international 
treaties and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court into the 
decisions of the high courts of several states.  National courts are 
engaging in the trans-nationalization of the decisions of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. 
Actors within the Inter-American system face another important 
challenge:  strengthening the exigibility of “conventionality.”  I 
believe that the work of creating a dialogue between national and 
international courts does not lie within these institutions alone, but 
should be taken up by litigants within the system.  They must demand 
that national courts apply international standards and persuade 
domestic judges to do so.  I believe that, in this respect, the Inter-
American Court is working to fortify civil society and other actors so 
that they may present these demands to domestic authorities. 
I would also like to mention, as a side note, another challenge that 
I believe is very important:  how to incorporate public defenders, as 
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emerging actors, into the system of Inter-American litigation.  I use 
the term “public defenders” to mean lawyers provided free of charge 
by the state to anyone who does not have access to legal assistance.  In 
Latin America, eighty to ninety percent of all criminal defendants are 
represented by public defenders who often serve to reveal the 
problems with due process that exist in the region.  We are currently 
seeing the first cases brought by public defenders to the system.  I am 
referring specifically to cases in Guatemala and Argentina and other 
countries, where state-employed attorneys have identified structural 
problems and brought them before the Inter-American Court.  For 
example, death penalty cases against Guatemala were brought by 
public defenders, and as a result of these cases, hundreds of other 
cases involving citizens in the same situation have been resolved.63 I 
believe that this work is crucial, particularly because it allows those 
with few economic resources to access Inter-American justice.  Thus, 
providing public defenders with better training and greater access to 
the Inter-American system is important.  I also believe that 
ombudsmen need to play a fundamental role in the future of the 
Inter-American system.  We are seeing many cases in which 
ombudsmen use the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court in 
order to resolve disputes.  This has occurred, for example, in the 
Federal District of Mexico and in other states. 
These are some of the important challenges that the Inter-
American system is facing, but there are other significant problems 
that must be confronted as well.  One is the problem of universality:  
not all of the countries in this hemisphere have ratified the American 
Convention.  Of the thirty-four states that are part of the OAS, the 
Inter-American Court only has jurisdiction over twenty-one.  In the 
panel this morning, another participant said that it was necessary to 
follow the European system’s example in creating a political body to 
supervise compliance with the decisions of the Inter-American Court.  
In my opinion, it will be impossible to do so within the CJPA until all 
of the American states have ratified the American Convention.  
Currently, if such a body were created, a group of states that have not 
ratified the American Convention would be able to supervise the 
compliance of those states that have ratified the Convention and 
recognized the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court.  
Furthermore, I believe that universality is a fundamental challenge 
for the Inter-American system because the current situation of 
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inequality between the states creates inequality among the citizens of 
the Americas, barring many from accessing Inter-American justice.  
Finally, as long as some states do not ratify the American Convention, 
the resources committed to the development of the system will be 
inadequate. 
The budgetary problem of the Inter-American system, which 
includes both the Court and the Commission, is one that I always 
mention at the forums that I attend.  Only to present the issue, 
because I believe Santiago Canton will talk about this problem from 
the perspective of the Inter-American Commission, the Inter-
American Court today has the fewest resources of any international 
tribunal in the world.  The recently created African Court has a 
budget that is twenty percent greater than that of the Inter-American 
Court.  This reflects somewhat the political priorities within the OAS, 
where the discourse on the importance of the system is not 
translating into contributions for its financing.  Only after five or six 
years of struggle were judges on the Inter-American Court able to 
receive a monthly salary of $1,000 dollars.  The budget of the Court is 
$1,700,000 dollars, but this amount is not sufficient to fund all of its 
undertakings.  Today the Court subsists thanks to the support of 
Spain and Norway and the voluntary contributions of some individual 
member states of the OAS.  Without this financial support, the Court 
would be forced to severely cut the number of cases it hears and its 
activities of supervision, education, and promotion.  However, these 
resources are not guaranteed in the future.  I believe that many of the 
problems of the Inter-American system stem from this issue.  As long 
as the system does not receive adequate resources in a consistent 
manner, it will not be able to plan for the long term. 
However, despite these challenges, the Inter-American Court has 
become a well-respected institution among the states of the Americas 
and among civil society after thirty years.  It has achieved very positive 
results in terms of states’ compliance with its judgments.  And 
through the reparations that it has ordered, it has been able to 
provide victims with redress and has impacted both the jurisprudence 
of national courts and domestic legislation.  Thank you very much. 
****** 
Diego Rodríguez-Pinzón:  I think these remarks present us with some 
issues that we will hopefully be able to discuss for our work regarding 
the dialogue between the systems:  issues such as the Fourth Instance 
Formula of the Inter-American Commission versus the margin of 
appreciation used by the European Court, which could also be very 
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relevant to what is happening in the African system.  This is a brief 
reference seeking to provoke you in this regard. 
We have the pleasure of having Santiago Canton, Executive 
Secretary of the Inter-American Commission here with us today.  
Santiago has also been a Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Expression of the OAS.  Working in several capacities with the system, 
he has made tremendous contributions to our region.  Santiago has 
been a big supporter of the Inter-American Human Rights Moot 
Court Competition that we host at the Washington College of Law, 
among many other human rights initiatives. 
C. Santiago Canton64 
I would like to thank the organizers for the invitation, and I would 
like to congratulate them for providing me with the opportunity to 
discuss the different regional systems for the protection of human 
rights with scholars, activists, and practitioners from all the regions.  
There is a large vacuum at the international level concerning the 
coordination among international human rights organizations.  In 
many aspects, international civil society organizations are more 
coordinated than international institutions with supervisory authority.  
This vacuum must be filled if we are to strengthen the protective 
capabilities of these organizations.  I believe that such coordination 
should be under the umbrella of the UN High Commissioner’s 
Office.  However, in the absence of such coordination these 
exchanges are more than welcome and needed. 
In the short time I have, I will refer to what I consider to be among 
the main challenges of the Inter-American system.  In so doing, I will 
refer also to what I consider to be the backbone of the system.  Only 
then can we understand the challenges we are facing. 
In the Americas, the system for the protection of human rights is 
sustained by four fundamental pillars.  The first pillar is the 
international instruments for the protection of human rights.  The 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man—approved in 
1948 just a few months before the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights—jump-started a process of developing international human 
rights instruments that still runs today.  Seven instruments have been 
approved in the region and two more are in the working stages.65 
                                                 
 64.  Executive Secretary, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
Organization of American States. Previously, Mr. Canton was the OAS Special 
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. 
 65.  The American Convention on Human Rights (1969); the Protocol on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights or “Protocol of San Salvador” (1988); the 
Protocol to Abolish the Death Penalty (1990); the Inter-American Convention to 
  
236 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.  59:163 
A second pillar is the international bodies created to supervise the 
rights recognized in the international legal instruments.  The Inter-
American system, modeled after the European system and similar to 
the African model, is composed of two bodies:  the Commission and 
the Court.  The Commission was created in 1959 and the Court in 
1979.  Today, the combined and complementary efforts of both 
bodies have reached a level of development that has become essential 
for protecting the rights of individuals all over the Americas and for 
strengthening the rule of law in many countries in the region. 
A third pillar is civil society.  In the Inter-American system, civil 
society has been the main engine that keeps the system active and 
responsive to the needs of the people.  Latin America’s civil society 
became actively engaged with the Commission during the years of the 
dictatorships in the Southern Cone. 
  Civil society found, in the Inter-American Commission, the last 
and only recourse available to denounce the grave and massive 
violations that were taking place.  While all the doors in its countries 
had closed, the Commission provided civil society its only 
opportunity.  And the Commission played a decisive role by visiting 
the countries and preparing reports denouncing the violations to the 
international community.  Since those days, a mutually beneficial 
relationship between the Commission and civil society has been 
critical in shaping the Inter-American system as it is today.  None of 
the progress and results achieved in the protection of human rights 
in the Americas can be understood without taking into consideration 
this fertile relationship. 
The fourth pillar is the states of the Americas.  The states have 
created the system, have drafted and approved the international legal 
instruments, and have created the supervisory organs.  Clearly, the 
creation of the system comes together with the responsibility to 
ensure that it works efficiently.  The responsibilities of the states are 
many, but I will focus mainly on four that I believe are critical. 
First, the states have the responsibility of nominating the best 
possible candidates for Commissioners and Judges.  The importance 
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of this is obvious, but I would like to highlight that the independence 
and autonomy of the Commission and the Court have been the main 
reason behind the success of the system, and this depends a great 
deal on the composition of the organs.  Throughout the history of 
the system, we have been, in general, very fortunate to have a good 
composition in both institutions.  However, it is also true that, many 
times, the nomination of and voting for members of the Commission 
and the Court are based on political considerations rather than on a 
selection of the best possible human rights experts. 
A second responsibility of the states is to ensure that the Inter-
American Commission and the Court have the resources needed to 
efficiently fulfill the mandates given to them by the same states that 
created them.  Today, that is far from a reality.  Approximately only 
five percent of the OAS budget is allocated for the Commission and 
the Court.  It is shameful that the Inter-American system of human 
rights functions principally with the financial support it receives from 
external benefactors.  Today, more than fifty percent of the resources 
come from external donors, but those resources are still not sufficient 
to comply adequately with all of our mandates.  If the need for 
resources is not resolved soon, it will be very difficult to maintain a 
stable and efficient system. 
The allocation of the OAS budget is a political decision.  The 
political will to strengthen the Inter-American system, expressed 
consistently by the member states, should be followed by the concrete 
action of redrafting a budget that has previously kept the percent 
allocated to the human rights system at about five percent for more 
than a decade even though the mandates and the number of 
complaints it receives have more than tripled. 
A third responsibility of the states is to ratify all the Inter-American 
human rights instruments.  Only eight countries have ratified all of 
them.66  The need for ratification is particularly critical when it comes 
to the Inter-American Convention.  Without full ratification by all 
member states, it will not be possible to have a system that equally 
protects all people in the Americas.  This means effectively denying 
access to international justice to millions of people. 
A fourth responsibility of the states is to comply with the decisions 
of the Inter-American Commission and the Court.  It simply does not 
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make sense to create a human rights system where the system is given 
a mandate to receive and process complaints, given a mandate to 
make recommendations and pass judgments, and given a mandate to 
supervise compliance with the international legal instruments, yet the 
states are not going to comply. 
Compliance in the Inter-American system is moving in the right 
direction, but it is still far from been fully realized.  Let me first 
mention some good examples of compliance. 
Many Inter-American Commission cases have helped bring about 
structural reforms within the states, enabling the defense and 
protection of human rights for millions of people.  A few examples 
give a sense as to the magnitude of the Commission’s contributions. 
In 1992, the Inter-American Commission was the first international 
human rights body to determine that amnesty laws are a violation of 
international human rights law.  Specifically, the Commission ruled 
that amnesty laws were a violation of the American Convention and 
of the Declaration and should be left without effect.67  These 
decisions helped trigger a process that ended with similar Inter-
American Court decisions68 and eventually led to the derogation of 
amnesty laws in Peru and Argentina, paving the way to end impunity 
for rights violations of the past.  This significantly contributed to the 
process of strengthening the rule of law in the region. 
Another essential contribution of the Inter-American Commission 
has to do with the so-called leyes de desacato, or contempt laws, that 
penalize the criticism of public officials.  The Commission declared 
these laws to be in violation of the American Convention on Human 
Rights and recommended that all states repeal them.  Today, at least 
ten countries in the region have done so.69  I could mention many 
other examples of significant advances, such as the repeal of an 
article of the Constitution in Chile that allowed prior censorship; the 
sanction of a new law against domestic violence in Brazil; the 
significant reform of the military justice code in Argentina; and many 
others. 
Regardless of these examples that show the effectiveness of the 
system, the numbers regarding full compliance show a different story.  
                                                 
 67.  IACHR, Report No. 28/92, Cases 10.147, 10.181, 10.240, 10.262, 10.309 and 
10.311, Argentina, Oct. 2, 1992, available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/92eng/ 
Argentina10.147.htm; IACHR, Report No. 29/92, Cases 10.029, 10.036, 10.145, 
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 68. See Case of Barrios Altos, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75 (Mar. 14, 2001). 
 69. Belize, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, 
Paraguay, and Peru. 
  
2009] ADVOCACY BEFORE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES 239 
For instance, I believe that the Inter-American Court has been able to 
close no more than ten cases out of 110 that have been decided.  This 
is less than ten percent of compliance.  The situation is very similar to 
the Inter-American Commission.  However, it is very important to 
keep in mind that while full compliance is very rare, partial 
compliance is becoming more and more the norm.  For instance, 
Pablo Saavedra, the Executive Secretary of the Court, said that eighty-
one percent of the monetary compensations have been complied 
with.  That is obviously an excellent figure.  In addition, other forms 
of reparations, like the recognition of responsibility, are also on the 
rise.  However, a central aspect of the decisions and 
recommendations has always been the realization of justice in each 
individual case.  This aspect is very far from being complied with.  
Unfortunately, in this arena we have a long way to go. 
I believe that compliance with the decisions is the principal 
challenge down the road for the Inter-American system.  
Unfortunately, compliance relies too heavily on the political will of 
the governments to fulfill their human rights obligations.  When 
there is political will, compliance is easier to achieve.  Without that 
will, it is very difficult to obtain good results.  That should not be the 
case.  We will be able to say that we have reached a good degree of 
maturity in the Inter-American system when governments that do not 
want to comply do so anyway—when they feel obliged to, either by 
international or national law. 
This is one of the areas in the field of international human rights 
law, at least in the Inter-American system, where there is very little 
development:  national legislation to comply with international 
decisions.  Today, only three countries in the Americas have specific 
regulations to comply with the decisions of the Inter-American 
human rights bodies:  Costa Rica, Peru, and Colombia.  And even in 
those three cases, the laws are far from ideal.  I strongly believe that 
this legal vacuum must be filled in order to ensure that political will 
no longer is needed to fulfill the human rights obligations.  
There are many other issues that I would like to share with you, but 
my time has run out.  I am very grateful, once again, to be here to 
share with you some ideas and to discuss them openly with other 
international institutions.  These discussions can only strengthen our 
work and make the ideals of human rights truly universal.  Thank you 
very much. 
  
240 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.  59:163 
****** 
Diego Rodríguez-Pinzón:  Santiago, thank you very much.  You 
mentioned the importance of interaction between the national and 
the international levels.  I just want to call your attention to the Inter-
American experience regarding that subject.  Civil society has played 
a very important role in this hemisphere. 
Now I invite to the floor Judge Fatsah Ouguergouz.  We are 
delighted to have you here.  Mr. Ouguergouz is a judge of the African 
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights in Arusha, Tanzania.  He is also 
a member of the African Foundation of International Law.  He has 
worked as Secretariat of the International Court of Justice for twelve 
years in The Hague.  He has extensive experience in international 
public law, and he is currently the Father Robert Drinan Professor of 
Human Rights at George Washington University Law School.  
Additionally, he has written extensively.  One of his most recent 
publications is the book, The African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights, A Comprehensive Agenda for Human Dignity and Sustainable 
Democracy in Africa.70 
D. Fatsah Ouguergouz71 
Dear Dean Grossman, dear Mr. Fanton, dear commissioners and 
judges, dear colleagues, dear ladies and gentleman, Mr. Chairman of 
the panel.  I first wish to say that I am very pleased and honored to be 
here today sitting on this panel and participating in this conference.  
If I am not mistaken, the African Court of Human and Peoples’ 
Rights is the youngest of the institutions and bodies which are 
represented here today.  It is also the lesser known of those 
institutions and bodies.  I would even say that it is unknown, both 
inside and outside the African continent. 
The African Court, therefore, never misses a chance to enhance its 
visibility.  Visibility of the Court is actually one of the current major 
changes that the Court is facing, and invitations to participate in such 
events are greatly contributing to popularizing the existence and the 
activities of the Court, which is the first judicial body ever established 
on the African continent.  I wish, on behalf of the Court and also in 
my personal capacity, to thank the organizers of this conference, in 
                                                 
 70. FATSAH OUGUERGOUZ, THE AFRICA CHARTER OF HUMAN & PEOPLE’S RIGHTS:  A 
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particular Dean Grossman from American University, as well as Mr. 
Jonathan Fanton from the MacArthur Foundation, as well as the 
other participating organizations and sponsoring organizations. 
I have listened very carefully to all the previous speakers, the 
learned speakers, either this morning or this afternoon, and they 
were all dwelling about the issue of compliance and implementation 
and decisions of their respective bodies.  I am afraid that I cannot do 
the same thing.  The African Court has so far not completed the 
examination of one single case, so I decided to give you a brief 
overview of the challenges that the African system is facing and, of 
course, the African Court itself, which is a part of the African system.  
Before turning to the challenges, I should say some words about the 
Court and its achievements.  Most of you might indeed not be very 
familiar with the African Court. 
So briefly speaking, the African Court is composed of eleven 
members.  The judges are working on a part-time basis, as in the 
Inter-American system.  However, in the African system, the President 
is working full-time, unlike the Inter-American system.  The first 
members of the bench had been elected in January 2006 and we were 
sworn in July 2006.  The Court has now existed for a little bit more 
than two years.  In two years, we have already held eleven sessions—
ten ordinary sessions and one extraordinary session—but I must say 
that all the sessions were extraordinary because of the interest and 
challenge of launching a new body.  The seat of the Court is in 
Arusha, Tanzania. 
One thing that I should stress, one main feature of the African 
Court, is that the Court has been given a very broad jurisdiction both 
in its contentious function and advisory function; very broad 
jurisdiction.  The jurisdiction of the Court actually extends far 
beyond the control of the implementation and the application of the 
sole African Charter to embrace all other relevant international 
human rights instruments.  It is Article 3 of the Protocol which 
provides for this very broad jurisdiction. 
Turning now to the achievements of the African Court during the 
last two years, I will be very brief.  The main achievements are the 
following:  the Court has prepared its budget for the year 2007 and 
2008.  And I should mention that the budget of the Court is rather 
consistent, rather high.  It is about $8 million dollars for 2008.  By the 
way, the budget of the African Commission was raised at the same 
time.  One of the first major tasks of the Court was to negotiate the 
budget with the African Union’s political bodies.  This negotiation 
was rather successful. 
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The second main achievement is the drawing-up of a registry 
structure.  We had to build up a registry, so we had to fight also with 
the African Union political bodies in order to get the structure of the 
Registry approved.  We got an authorization to hire about forty-six 
staff members, which is high.  We asked for seventy-six staff members, 
and we got more than half, which is rather good.  The process of 
recruitment of this staff is already completed.  However, we do not 
have office space to accommodate them.  That is why we have only 
about half a dozen staff members within the premises of the African 
Court so far. 
The other important issue is the drafting and the negotiation of a 
headquarter agreement with the government of Tanzania.  This was 
also a very complex exercise, and it has been successfully completed. 
Last, but not least, the Court has achieved the drafting of its rules 
of procedure—of its Rules of Court.  I would say that the drafting of 
the Rules of Court was the most time consuming and difficult activity 
conducted by the Court so far during its first years of existence.  I 
should also underline that this drafting exercise has not been fully 
completed.  The rules that we have adopted this last June have, 
indeed, an interim character.  They have been adopted on a 
provisional basis only.  We are waiting to hold some talks with the 
African Commission on Human and People’s Rights in order to 
harmonize our rules with theirs. 
Talking about the Rules of Court, I think it is a very good transition 
to shift to the issue of challenges.  There are three major challenges 
that the African system is facing.  In dealing with these three 
challenges, the ability of the Court varies.  As far as the first challenge 
is concerned, the Court can do a lot.  As far as the second challenge 
is concerned, the Court cannot do much.  But as far as the third 
challenge is concerned, the Court can do nothing. 
I turn now to the first challenge.  The first challenge, and I would 
say the most crucial and important one, is to make the African Court 
and the Commission work together.  Now that the African Court has 
been launched, it indeed needs to be fastened, to be linked in an 
efficient and coordinated way with the one-tier existing system so far.  
That is, essentially, the African Commission.  This is a rather sensitive 
operation which needs to be carried out very carefully.  I would 
compare this operation with the docking of an American or Russian 
spacecraft to the International Space Station, which never goes 
without any technical complications.  Why is the docking of the Court 
to the Commission a sensitive operation?  Because contrary to the 
establishment of the other regional conventions—the Inter-American 
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system as it exists now and the European system before the 
convention—the protocol establishing the Court does not provide for 
detailed provisions concerning the relationship between the African 
Commission, on the one hand, and the African Court, on the other 
hand.  The Inter-American Convention provides for very specific 
provisions for the interaction between the two bodies, and so did the 
ECHR before its amendment by its Protocol No. 11. 
The protocol establishing the African Court does not provide for a 
precise articulation between the two bodies.  It contains one single 
provision which is entitled, “Relationship Between the Court and the 
Commission.”  But the provision is hollow; it just says that the Court 
complements the protective activities of the African Commission.  
Later on, I can dwell on those relationships, but what I should say 
right now is that contrary to the European and Inter-American 
systems, where the relationship between the Court and Commission is 
a one-way relationship—from the Commission to the Court mainly, 
except maybe for provisional measures—the relationship between the 
African Court and the African Commission as it is now provided for 
by the protocol, is a two-way relationship:  from the Commission to 
the Court and from the Court to the Commission.  So it is a very 
interesting and synergetic kind of relationship.  There is a lot of 
potential for the relationship between the Court and the 
Commission.  A meeting with the African Commission has been 
planned for the discussion and harmonization of the Rules of the 
Court and of the Commission. 
The second challenge the African system is facing is that of access 
to the Court.  Now that the African Court is one of the two important 
organs of the African system, the main issue is access to the Court.  
To be more specific, I would say access to the court by NGOs and 
individuals.  There are indeed four kinds of entities which can access 
the court:  the African Commission itself, the state parties to the 
protocol, African intergovernmental organizations, and—on an 
optional basis—individuals and NGOs.  So out of fifty-three member 
states of the African Union which are also parties to the African 
Charter, only twenty-four states have so far ratified and are parties to 
the protocol.  But out of these twenty-four states, only two states have 
accepted the optional jurisdiction of the Court to entertain claims 
from individuals or NGOs.  Two states only:  Burkina Faso and Mali. 
So the challenge now is for the Court to open up access to its 
jurisdiction.  But the Court cannot do much in this field.  It is a 
matter of campaigning, of promotional work, and the Court is not 
really equipped to conduct these kinds of activities.  This is more the 
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role of the civil society through the NGOs or such organizations like 
the African Commission, which are very keen on promotional work.  
Maybe the Commission can help us to publicize and to lobby civil 
societies and governments in order to ratify the protocol more 
extensively and open up the access to the individuals by filing the 
special declaration under Article 34, paragraph 6, of the Protocol. 
The third challenge that the African system is facing is the most 
difficult one, and for which the African Court cannot do much.  This 
challenge relates to the merger of the African Court of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights with the Court of Justice of the African Union. 
In a nutshell, in 2004, African heads of state decided to merge two 
different courts:  the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
whose protocol already entered into force, and the Court of Justice of 
the African Union, which was a court established by a 2003 protocol 
that did not enter into force at that time and which is still not in force 
today.  The Court of Justice of the African Union has more or less the 
same jurisdiction as the Luxembourg European Court of Justice.  
During the last summit held in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt in July 2008, 
the protocol on the merger of the two courts was adopted by the 
Assembly of Heads of State of the African Union.  It needs about 
fifteen ratifications in order to enter into force, which might take a 
couple of years or more. 
So this new merged African Court would consist of sixteen judges 
working part-time, and of two sections:  one dealing with general 
legal matters and the other dealing with human rights issues.  This 
court will also have a very, very broad jurisdiction, and this is where 
the problem lies.  This Court will indeed have the combined 
jurisdiction of the European Court, of the Court of Justice of 
Luxembourg, of the International Court of Justice, and of the UN 
Administrative Tribunal.  In other words, the new merged African 
Court will have jurisdiction for human rights issues, general 
international law issues, constitutional issues within the African 
Union, and it will also be authorized to entertain appeals from the 
staff of the African Union.  All this would be taken care of by sixteen 
judges working part-time. 
So the challenge would be to dock this merged court with the 
existing system when the protocol will enter into force.  So remember 
the spacecraft and the International Space Station, with the 
difference that the spacecraft is twice as big as before—twice bigger 
than the existing African Court.  And there are, of course, many 
concerns as far as this docking is concerned, since the judges of the 
current African Court, the bench of the current Court, including 
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myself, will be “resigned”—or, in other words, will be dismissed.  So 
there will be a totally new court which is going to be established, 
creating some very important and crucial issues of judicial legacy. 
The European Court, as I understand it, has a docket of about 
100,000 applications so far.  I do not have a precise figure for the 
Inter-American Court, but I gave you already the sharp figure for the 
African Court:  zero cases, none.  My main concern for the next few 
months or years is that the Court will be seen as doing nothing.  This 
might undermine the credibility of the African Court and the 
expectation of the African populations in this matter.  Let me remind 
you, and I speak here under the control of my friend, Commissioner 
Bahame Nyanduga, that the African Commission during its first years 
of existence has been very harshly criticized because it was apparently 
regarded as doing nothing.  Actually, the Commission was also 
struggling with a lot of organizational issues.  It was doing many 
things underground.  It was, in a way, fertilizing the soil.  One 
question from this morning asked, “What did the African 
Commission do during these last twenty years?”  I would say, even if 
you do not see any flowers or any trees, the Commission has played a 
very important role.  It has fertilized the African soil.  It has created, 
or tried to create, a human rights culture on the African continent. 
For my part, I was very sympathetic with the African Commission, 
and I used to compare this body to the character from the Greek 
mythology:  Sisyphus and his famous rock.  And I used to say that, like 
Sisyphus, the Commission was not rolling for nothing, but was in fact, 
flexing her muscles.  I hope that this will prove true as well for the 
African Court, and that even though we do not have any cases so far, 
we might be able to do lots of work which will prepare and pave the 
way for future cases to be brought before the Court.  Thank you very 
much for your kind attention. 
****** 
Diego Rodríguez-Pinzón:  Finally, we are inviting to the floor an 
expert on the European system, Mr. Andrew Drzemczewski.  
Interestingly enough, I remember fifteen years ago when I was 
studying for my master’s degree and working with a group of young 
colleagues, including my friend Claudia Martin, in a human rights 
interest group.  We were publishing one of the first issues of the 
Human Rights Brief, a Washington College of Law publication.  My 
colleagues researching the European system found that one of your 
papers was one of the most interesting and challenging essays 
regarding Protocol 11 of the European Convention.  Therefore, Mr. 
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Drzemczewski has been for me and my colleagues a very important 
reference, regarding the practice of the European human rights 
system.  So we are institutionally and personally delighted to have you 
here. 
E. Andrew  Drzemczewski72 
My title in this pamphlet is, Andrew Drzemczewski, Head of 
Secretariat, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the 
Council of Europe.  An introductory remark and then three points. 
The introductory remark is that, in effect, I am the head of the 
Secretariat of the Committee of Legal Affairs & Human Rights of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council.  During the break, I 
explained we have the Council of Europe, created in 1949 by statute.  
That statute describes two organs.  On the one hand, there are the 
committee ministers—foreign ministers represented by ambassadors 
in Strasbourg.  On the other hand, there is the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, which is much more important 
than initially meets the eye because of the dual role of 
parliamentarians and their possible influence on the domestic plane.  
In this respect, they are unlike, for example, the European 
Parliament, which is in a different category. 
It is worth pointing out that the Legal Affairs Committee has 
eighty-four parliamentarians.  But what is probably more important, 
is that the parliamentary assembly played a key role and was the 
political motor in creating the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture.  
It has an enormously important political role to play.  And tied to 
this, the assembly also has an important role because the assembly 
parliamentarians elect judges to the European Court of Human 
Rights.  And before they are elected, they are interviewed—in-
confidence, in-camera discussions—by a subcommittee of the Legal 
Affairs Committee.  Over the last two years, the parliamentary 
assembly has rejected, six times, lists of three candidates provided by 
the government.  There is an element of political credibility and 
status—a judge must have the required professional qualifications 
and experience to be elected to the Strasbourg Court.  The Assembly 
will reject lists when candidatures are considered not to be up-to-
standard, not providing the Assembly with a real choice.73 
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My first of the three points.  The European Court of Human Rights 
is a victim of its own success.  We tend to say that in Strasbourg.  
Perhaps, if you bear in mind the subsidiary element of what is meant 
to be at Strasbourg, it is the member states which have not sufficiently 
put their house into order in order to prevent potential applicants 
from coming to Strasbourg.  The situation within Strasbourg, at the 
European Court, is obviously serious. 
A few statistics.  In the first nine months of this year, after 
September 30, the European Court has nearly 95,000 cases pending.  
In the first nine months of this year, the Court registered 
approximately 37,500 applications.  During the same period, the 
Court has rendered around 22,000 judgments or decisions; in effect, 
a rhythm of 30,000 per year.  The backlog is growing.  In the last nine 
months, the backlog has grown to 15,500.  That is about 1,700 per 
month.  To aggravate the situation, over the last two months, the 
Court has received more than 2,800 applications from South Ossetia 
in Georgia.  And, I must not forget the interstate case of Georgia 
against Russia. 
The European Court has done extraordinary work here.  The 
number of judges has grown from forty-two, forty-three, to now forty-
seven.  What is probably more important is that, with respect to the 
number of judgments and decisions in the ten years since Protocol 11 
has come into effect, the Court has multiplied its work eight-fold.  At 
the same time, the Court has tripled its Secretariat, which now stands 
at just over 620 staff members.  And here again, forget about the 
Court for a moment.  If one talks about execution of judgments, 
there is a judgment of the court that needs to be executed.  What 
Charlotte de Broutelles mentioned, which many of you possibly have 
not noticed, there is a section of people who help in the execution of 
court judgments within the Secretariat.  They have nearly 7,000 cases 
pending with respect to execution before the Committee of 
Ministers—implementation if you like, rather than execution.  And 
the staff members, if I am not mistaken, are twenty-three, six of whom 
are temporary. 
My second point:  the Court’s future.  I can pose this as a question:  
the European Court, as was mentioned by Paola Carozza in our lunch 
discussion, is really sitting between two stools, is it not?  Will the 
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Court actually collapse?  By sitting between two stools, will it fall apart 
and not succeed, having in mind the statistics I just provided you 
with?  Now, the balancing act, as was discussed at the lunch break, is 
self-evident.  On the one hand, you have the right of individual 
petition.  The right of individual petition—the individual’s 
procedural and substantive right on the international plane—is an 
achievement which we cannot give up.  To give this up would be 
unacceptable.  On the other hand, it is a quasi-constitutional court, 
whereby it has to maintain constitutional European standards on the 
international plane. 
The question is, should it do both?  Should it not?  We have had 
ideas whether or not we should have the system of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, the docket-choosing, the certiorari system, the German 
constitutional court (a system, basically, of the right of individual 
complaint and norm control).  We are now brainstorming as to how 
to get out of this difficult situation.  We do not have any miracle 
solution.  We have to maintain, on the one hand, the right of 
individual petition and, on the other hand, the constitutional role 
that the Court plays.  It is a function which is hybrid and, as far as I 
am concerned, and I hope my colleague agrees with me, is tough but 
needs to be somehow maintained.  But this is what has made the 
success story of the Council of Europe, and it is not for us to jump 
onto one bandwagon forgetting about the important need for a 
judicial determination with respect to individual applications, 
because this is what it is all about:  an individual’s human rights. 
One word about the problem of Protocol 14.  Protocol 14 was 
introduced a few years back to speed up the system—a single judge 
would replace a committee of three judges in determining obviously 
inadmissible applications, and a committee of three judges to take 
the place of seven when cases were obviously “manifestly well-
founded” and concerned well-established case-law.  The Russians are 
blocking it because the Russian State Duma has not allowed for the 
ratification of the Protocol 14.  It has been blocked.  The system 
would have allowed the Court to accelerate its work between twenty 
and twenty-five percent had Protocol 14 already gone into effect a 
couple of years ago.  We are in a difficult situation.  Some would say 
this is the make or break situation concerning Protocol 14.  Our legal 
committee’s next meeting will be in Moscow on the 10th and 11th of 
November, in a few weeks’ time.  During that meeting, we will be 
speaking with the Legal Committee of the Russian State Duma, and 
we will see to what extent the State Duma is prepared to reconsider 
its view as to whether or not Protocol 14 should be ratified. 
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My third point:  international challenges in the wider context.  
There are many, but I will focus on two or three of them.  The first 
one is the European Union and the protection of human rights.  You 
have the European Union of twenty-seven member states as opposed 
to the forty-seven Council of Europe member states.  It has an 
enormous bureaucracy.  It has exceptional, in effect, state powers 
which are not subject to any international judicial human rights 
control mechanism.  The Lisbon Treaty envisaged accession of the 
European Union to the European Convention of Human Rights.  
This should still be very much a priority so that we have a 
constitutional system which is covered by a human rights regional 
mechanism in Europe. 
Regarding innovations, especially with respect to the Strasbourg 
Court case law and the impact of the Court’s leading judgments in 
the domestic law of member states, I will mention two which have 
been discussed today:  pilot judgments and ensuring the execution of 
the Court’s own judgments. 
Pilot judgments.  This procedure has, in effect, indirectly extended 
the benefits of the findings of the Court to all the persons in similar 
situations.  We say, “Great.  Why not copy it?  Why not move on?”  Let 
me introduce a few complications. 
These are significant developments, but we must beware of certain 
things about this procedure.  It needs fine tuning.  For example, who 
determines whether there exists a systemic problem?  The Grand 
Chamber, surely.  But the Grand Chamber is at the end of the line; 
there is also the Chamber.  The Grand Chamber must determine 
whether or not to come out with a pilot judgment.  There may be 
other cases which deserve similar treatment.  Obviously, this 
procedure deals with complex issues based on a single case and does 
not necessarily reveal other related aspects in similar, but not 
identical cases.  Hence, pilot judgments may only, in certain 
instances, partially identify systemic problems.  In the mean time, 
other related types of cases will be frozen and not looked into, 
further delaying the determination by the Strasburg Court of their 
cases.  So yes, pilot judgments may well be considered as a partial 
answer to the Court’s workload, but, in reality, the situation is not so 
simple. 
A word about the execution of Strasbourg Court judgments.  In 
effect, it is the committee ministers who supervise the execution of 
the Strasbourg Court judgments.  To a certain extent, our European 
Court of Human Rights is always known to make declaratory 
determinations, and it is up to the committee ministers to supervise 
  
250 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.  59:163 
the execution of Court judgments.  In the case Assanidze v. Georgia,74 
the Court in effect gave the state no discretion—you have to let the 
person out of prison, there is no issue here.  In effect, is this 
judgment not usurping or going into areas strictly within the 
competence of the committee ministers? 
The impact of the court judgments case law, sometimes termed as 
Grand Chamber Judgments of Principle of precedential value, not to 
say, erga omnes effect.  Article 46, paragraph 2 specifies that only the 
state with respect to which there is a judgment by the Court is bound 
by that judgment.  But to what extent are all state parties bound by 
such judgments of principle?  Let me refer you to the cases Golder v. 
United Kingdom,75 regarding right of access to the Court, and 
Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey,76 regarding the binding nature of 
interin measures.  It is in the Rules of Procedure of the Court, not in 
the actual Convention.  Let me also refer you to the cases Marckx v. 
Belgium,77 regarding children born out of wedlock, and Hirst v. United 
Kingdom,78 regarding prisoners’ rights to vote in elections.  These 
cases and their holdings provide food for thought.  It is de facto erga 
omnes.  De jure, it cannot be.  Very strange situation.  And we had some 
interesting comparative elements on this with respect to case law.  
You may recall the Argentina Supreme Court taking into account the 
Barrios Altos case from the Inter-American Court. 
And last, but not least, I want to comment on the Reform Package 
which was mentioned by my colleague, Charlotte de Broutelles.  It is 
too easy, in a nutshell, to say it is for Strasburg to deal with this matter 
itself.  Surely, let us throw the ball back into the court of the 
countries concerned.  It is for their judiciary to take into account the 
case law of the Strasbourg Court.  It is for the countries themselves to 
help out.  And if you look to the new aspect of Strasburg case law, 
there is a small handful of countries with massive systemic problems 
generating a large proportion of total applications, you have a 
situation where twenty-six percent of all applications are brought 
against Russia.  Nearly sixty percent of all cases pending before the 
Court of Strasburg relate to Russia, Romania, Ukraine, and Turkey.  
Should we not concentrate on those rather than try to reinvent the 
wheel and create a protocol 16, 17, or 18 in Strasburg?  Is it not really 
                                                 
 74. App. No. 71503/01, 39 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32 (2004). 
 75. 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17 (1975). 
 76. App. Nos. 46827/99 & 46951/99, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (2005). 
 77. 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 330 (1979). 
 78. (No. 2), 681 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005). 
  
2009] ADVOCACY BEFORE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES 251 
the duty of the member states to deal with those cases?  That would 
clear up a substantial backlog straight away. 
One problem is that the human rights instruments, on the one 
hand, are the common denominator in the European context, while 
at the same time, the Convention is a living instrument.  To what 
extent does one take into account the Court’s case law and a merging 
consensus in Europe on certain matters.  For example:  rights of 
homosexuals.  This had tremendous impact in that context. 
A few more examples.  In the United Kingdom, there is the 
Human Rights Act of 1998, which says that the domestic court must 
take into account the case law of the Court.  The German 
Constitutional Court has in effect said that the case law must be taken 
into account.  The Russian Constitutional Court has recently decided 
to set up a special ECHR case law research team in its own registry.  
The UK Parliament has the UK Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, which verifies draft legislation and legislation and its 
compatibility with the Convention and Strasburg case law.  Over the 
last few years, it has taken into account all cases where the UK has 
been found in violation and every year methodologically looks 
through these cases in a way in which a parliamentary body should.  
Similarly, in the Netherlands, the government agent before the Court 
makes a report to the government.  Our parliamentarians in the 
Legal Affairs Committee from the Netherlands insisted that that 
report go public.  And now, the justice committees of both houses of 
Parliament in the Netherlands are actually provided on an annual 
basis information concerning where the Netherlands has found 
violations.  More importantly, the committees are provided with case 
law of court, which may have legal importance with respect to the 
Netherlands, with respect to case law from other Contracting State 
Parties.  As a result, these bodies can short circuit and put right 
things, not waiting for the next ten years when applicants seek justice 
before the court.  Thank you. 
F. Discussion 
Diego Rodríguez-Pinzón:  Now we are going to open the floor for 
questions and comments from all of you. 
Let me begin by making a couple of comments and by asking 
questions for all of you.  It was mentioned that there have been very 
interesting practical measures adopted by some of the organs in the 
human rights regional systems.  For example, it was mentioned that 
the African Court has permanent judges.  Is that desirable?  Would 
that be an interesting feature for the Inter-American system to adopt?  
  
252 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.  59:163 
Another question.  Some international organs use the Internet to 
stream video to broadcast public hearings live around the world.  
Would that be a desirable practice for the Inter-American Court?  
What are the limitations for the use of this type of technology?  I 
simply ask about your reactions to these very specific features of 
several regional systems that could help other systems improve their 
proceedings and disseminate their work with relatively low budget 
technology. 
****** 
Pablo Saavedra:  Thank you, Diego.  With respect to the first 
question of whether it is necessary to have permanent judges, like a 
permanent court, I think it is a bit of what we discussed earlier.  It is 
first important to consider the sort of resources necessary for the 
Inter-American Court and the Commission and then decide priorities 
based on that.  This can be one of the priorities.  After having 
listened to the questions of the two panelists from Europe and Africa, 
I come out a bit more depressed because the African court started 
with $2.2 million three years ago, and today they have $8 million.  We 
have been in existence thirty years and recently reached $1.7 million.  
The European system is very interesting.  As we just saw, they have 
twenty-five percent of the budget of the European Council.  We just 
saw the Court and the Commission together have four percent of the 
budget of OAS.  That is, in total, $5 million.  The European Court 
has, more or less, € 50 million.  We can see the difference that exists, 
I think, and we need to look at the priorities and necessities that are 
most urgent for the system.  It could be the judges, but we can look to 
see if other necessities might be more urgent.  For example, the 
court, after thirty years, has twelve lawyers, and we have seen that the 
African system has forty-six lawyers and the European system has 
hundreds of lawyers.  They, therefore, are two different realities and 
that is why I think it has to be prioritized after an analysis of 
resources. 
With respect to technology, I think we need to celebrate the 
success the Court has had in the last several years.  In the last several 
years, I think we have had success in promoting the activities of the 
Court that have been most important.  We should celebrate these 
periods of success for the Court with public hearings, especially in 
San Jose and Costa Rica.  I think this has had a great impact because 
it has allowed the Inter-American system of human rights to get 
closer to the citizens of the countries and especially to the authorities 
of the states.  It has created a new dynamic of dialogue, and there is 
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now greater knowledge.  With technology, I think we are on the right 
path, but from the point of view of the Court, we have to be careful 
with witnesses so that they are not too exposed, for themselves, but 
also for reasons of security.  The new reality of these cases is that 
access may be gained through technological means, like television 
and the Internet, etc. 
****** 
Santiago Canton:  Two things I want to talk about in light of Diego’s 
comments.  One is the decision made approximately one year ago to 
transmit live the hearings of the Inter-American Commission.  They 
are all public and transmitted via the web.  We have been receiving 
very positive feedback regarding this new experience.  The 
webcasting of the hearings are being utilized by universities and 
NGOs for training lawyers and human rights activists all over the 
region and the world. 
Another comment I would like to highlight again in light of 
something Andrew said is the great importance of the independence 
and autonomy of the Inter-American Commission.  As I said before, 
the independence and autonomy of the Commission has been crucial 
in the development of the organization.  Over the last few years, two 
Commissioners resigned from the Commission due to their 
involvement in politics in their countries.  One case involved the 
acceptance of a ministry position, and, in the other, the participation 
in a political campaign helping a presidential candidate.  These 
decisions have only reinforced the importance that the Commission 
gives to its independence from any government activity.  And with 
that, I am very sorry, but I am going to have to leave to go back to the 
sessions of the Commission. 
****** 
Audience:  My first question is directed to the Treasurer of the 
African Court.  What impact do you think the future Court of Justice 
and Human Rights will have on the protection of human rights in the 
region?  I mean, is this a step forward or a step in terms of giving 
access to the victims in terms of improving the effectiveness of the 
regional system human rights protection?  My second question is 
actually an observation.  I have heard comparisons between the Inter-
American system and the European system on whether there should 
be a commission acting as a filtering mechanism to reduce case load, 
and suggestions that perhaps the Inter-American system is facing less 
serious case law problems thanks to the fact that it has a commission.  
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I have a problem in understanding that because I think that with or 
without a Human Rights Commission, the European system is still 
facing a similar and not such a different amount of cases than it is 
receiving now.  Secondly, if that is the case, why has the European 
system been so hesitant in creating a separate filtering body within 
the court itself to solve the problem? 
****** 
Fatsah Ouguergouz:  It is a very difficult question actually.  The 
establishment of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights:  is it 
a step forward or a step backward?  I would say yes, that it is definitely 
a step forward.  It is indeed a judicial body which has the potential to 
back the African Commission and strengthen the whole African 
system.  Its decisions are binding, but it is too early to predict what 
would be their impact on the African states. 
With respect to the merged court, I would not say that it is a step 
forward for sure.  I only hope that it is not a step backward.  This 
merger, if it were done properly, could have been—I would not say, a 
success—but not such a bad thing for the continental judicial system 
of Africa.  The African continent is a continent which now has the 
greatest numbers of international courts.  There are about seven 
regional (or sub-continental) courts on the African continent, plus 
the existing African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights and the 
African Court of Justice, which is not yet established. 
Seven years ago, the African states were already talking about a 
merger of the two courts, but the idea was rejected.  The idea was re-
introduced only three years ago, in July 2005, with no preparation—
out of the blue, I would say.  So now my concern is that this future, 
merged court, which has four kinds of jurisdiction, might not be able 
to deal efficiently with all the cases that involve issues ranging from 
border delimitation, use of force, issues of sovereignty, to African 
Union constitutional issues—I mean, interpretation, application, and 
implementation of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, staff 
appeals, and human rights. 
The African Court, which exists now and on the bench of which I 
am sitting, has already a very broad jurisdiction in the field of human 
rights, and there are already very complex being raised.  The Court is 
at its early stage of existence.  But there are very serious risks of 
forum shopping and possible fragmentation of the case law that 
could be raised in the near future.  The future court will also have to 
deal with this issue of forum shopping both in Africa and outside of 
Africa.  Indeed, in Africa, the states have the choice.  They can go to 
  
2009] ADVOCACY BEFORE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES 255 
the African Court, but they can also choose to go to other forums in 
their regions—the various regional courts.  They can also decide to 
go to the Human Rights Committee, for example, or other UN treaty 
bodies. 
Forum shopping and fragmentation of the case law are thus 
important issues.  But I would not dwell too much on the importance 
of the African Court.  The Court is indeed just a part of the whole 
system.  For sure, one should not underestimate the role of the Court 
for sure, but one should not over-estimate this role either.  The Court 
has to work hand-in-hand with the African Commission.  The African 
Commission still has a very important role to play, and it will have a 
very important role to play in the future.  What the Court can do and 
what the Court is trying to do so far is to create what is missing now in 
Africa’s judicial culture.  Commissioner Bahame Nyanduga this 
morning talked about the creation of a “human rights culture” within 
the African continent by the political bodies of the African Union.  
But what is missing is a “judicial” culture, both at the continental 
level and at the grassroots, municipal level.  There is no respect for 
judges at the national level.  Most of the African states do not really 
consider the decisions or the rulings of the judges.  So this is the first 
challenge actually.  The first challenge is to create this “judicial 
culture” and together with the human rights culture, which is 
underway.  This is what I wanted to say in response to your question 
concerning the potential role of the future merged court:  do not 
expect too much from both courts. 
****** 
Andrew Drzemczewski:  I have to answer you in a historical context.  
Unlike the Inter-American system, the European Convention created 
both the European Commission and the Court.  As you know, it had 
jurisdiction contingent on acceptance of its possibility of taking a case 
to the court.  And Protocol 11 was, at the time, negotiated for a 
variety of reasons.  Amongst those reasons was the fact that the 
European Commission dealt with cases, admissibility hearings, and 
the merits, and then it went to the Court.  And the Court repeated 
the same procedure.  There was, to a certain extent, already a certain 
competition between both organs.  The length of cases was enormous 
and the whole system was falling apart in the way of somebody getting 
justice ten to fifteen years after having brought his or her case before 
the Commission.  So Protocol 11, rightly or wrongly, hopefully 
rightly, brought together everything under the jurisdiction of one 
single court.  Within that Court we have committees of three judges 
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to deal with admissibility, chambers of seven judges, and a grand 
chamber of seventeen judges with a hybrid creation to accommodate 
those who wanted two levels of jurisdiction (with a possibility of 
relinquishment or referral from a chamber to the grand chamber). 
I suspect, politically and logically, we are not going to go back on 
that decision.  We have moved forward to a purely judicial system.  
The Group of Wise Persons have come out with the idea of having a 
judicial committee within the Court which would, in effect, do what is 
envisioned under Protocol 14.  A single judge would deal with 
patently inadmissible cases; for example, six-month rule brought 
against the wrong state or a non-exhaustion of local remedies which 
are obvious.  A committee of three would look into manifestly well-
founded cases.  Although it looks on the face of it interesting, my 
understanding of discussions within the Legal Affairs Committee, 
which I am trying to reflect honestly to you, is that the Legal Affairs 
Committee has strong reservations as to this idea.  It is very easy to 
become a judge on a grand chamber dealing with 100 cases.  Do we 
really need forty-seven judges to deal with 100 cases a year and to deal 
with constitutional cases while doing the real work of 
inadmissibility—the boring, difficult grind, the daily bread and butter 
work—left to the Judicial Committee?  How many people here, if you 
were judges of a high court or a supreme court, would be willing to 
take on the role of an inferior court to do the boring work, and 
anything interesting, you pass on to a higher court?  There are 
difficulties regarding how the system would work as it is proposed by 
the Wise Persons.  But, in a nutshell, this provision of having a junior 
element of functioning within the present full-time single court is 
presently on the table.79 
CLOSING REMARKS 
A. Diane Orentlicher 
I just want to do the obvious, which is to thank this extraordinarily 
distinguished group of panelists for a very rich discussion.  I think the 
discussion all day has underscored the value of fostering this type of 
exchange.  It has also probably underscored the value of continuing 
to do this.  I was trying to remember the expression, “victim of your 
own success,” that characterizes the dilemma that the European 
                                                 
 79. For more information about the report of the Group of Wise Persons, see 
Comm. Of Ministers, Interim Report of the Group of Wise Persons to the Committee 
of Ministers, 116th Sess., Doc. No. CM(2006) 88 (May 19, 2006). 
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system faces.  I think in some ways this conference was a victim of its 
own success.  We had so many fabulous speakers that it was hard to 
do justice to all of the issues that they raised.  So I do hope that this 
will inspire further exchanges of this sort, perhaps on an institutional 
basis. 
I know that I have come away from this with many ideas about ways 
that the organizations I am affiliated with might be able to bolster the 
work.  We have talked, in passing, about the importance of civil 
society in making these institutions work.  Any of us who have seen 
these institutions work over a long period have seen how important it 
is to have effective civil society demand that these institutions operate 
better than they already do and take them seriously.  And I think we 
have seen today some new agenda items that we need to pay attention 
to ourselves.  I found quite sobering—in the last panel in particular—
the degree to which states are not embarrassed by their non-
compliance.  That is another agenda item among many that came to 
my mind. 
I want to end by thanking the MacArthur Foundation, the Inter-
American Court and Commission, Agustina Del Campo, the 
MacArthur Foundation, and Claudio Grossman for providing the 
opportunity for us to have this dialogue.  I think a lot of really 
valuable ideas have come out of it.  So thank you. 
B. Claudio Grossman 
Allow me to join Diane in thanking the MacArthur Foundation, the 
Inter-American Court and Commission, and Agustina Del Campo as 
well as all of you who participated as panelists and attendees.  Finally, 
I want to extend our gratitude to Diane for creating this opportunity 
for us.  As you may already know, no good deed goes unpunished in 
this institution.  Because of the success of this program and the 
nature of the problems that we confront in the human rights field, I 
am sure that we will have further opportunities to exchange our views 
in the future. 
